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CHARACTER AND MOTIVE
IN EVIDENCE LAW
David P. Leonard*
INTRODUCTION
Motives affect behavior. Thus, although "motive" is not an es-
sential element of any charge, claim, or defense,' evidence that a per-
son has a particular motive can be relevant to an ultimate fact in both
civil and criminal cases. 2 The variety of circumstances in which
motive might be relevant is endless, and thus any effort to catalog the
possibilities would fail.3  The principle, however, is basic and
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School. A
version of this Article will appear in a volume of The New Wigmore: A Trea-
tise on Evidence, currently under way. I wish to thank students Carrie Robi-
tamille and Karl Schmidt for their research assistance, and colleagues Victor
Gold, Stanley Goldman, Laurie Levenson, and Gary Williams for their insights
into the Cunningham case, which was the subject of a faculty workshop at
Loyola Law School. We did not agree about Cunningham, but my colleagues'
thoughts helped guide me in arriving at the present analysis. Thanks also to
Howard Leonard, Ph.D., for his helpful insights about the nature of addiction.
1. See Huey L. Golden, Comment, Knowledge, Intent, System, and Mo-
five: A Much Needed Return to the Requirement of Independent Relevance, 55
LA. L. REV. 179, 206 (1994) (noting that motive is not normally an element of
the crime at issue in the case).
2. As Wigmore stated,
One is perhaps apt to think of "motive" as a matter involved in crimi-
nal cases only. But... the process involved--that of inferring the
existence of some emotion, from which in turn the doing of an act is to
be inferred--shows that this process may also be equally a feature of
proof in civil cases, though not as frequently as in criminal cases.
2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 389, at 416-17
(James H. Chadboum ed. rev. 1979) [hereinafter WIOMORE (1979)].
3. Referring to proof of emotions including motive, Wigmore made the
point forcefully:
Obviously, the whole range of human affairs is involved. It would be
idle to attempt to catalog the various facts of human life with reference
to their potency to excite a given emotion. Such an attempt would ex-
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simple: When motive is relevant, evidence tending to show its exis-
tence is usually admissible, subject to exclusion if the risk of unfair
prejudice is too great.
One method of proving the existence of a motive is to offer evi-
dence that the person alleged to have committed the act in question
has committed one or more other crimes, wrongs, or acts, and a rule
followed in every American jurisdiction 4 provides for admission of
such "uncharged misconduct" 5 when it is relevant to prove motive.
hibit two defects. It would be pedantic, because it is impossible to
suppose that the operation of human emotions can be reduced to fixed
rules, and that a given fact can have an unvarying quantity of emo-
tional potency. It would also be useless, because the emotional effect
of any fact must depend so often on the surrounding circumstances
that no general formula could provide for the infinite combination of
circumstances. Courts have therefore always been agreed that in gen-
eral no fixed negative rules can be made; that no circumstance can be
said beforehand to be without the power of exciting a given emotion;
and that, in general, any fact may be offered which by possibility can
be conceived as tending with others towards the emotion in question.
2 id. at 417.
4. The language most commonly used is that of Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). That rule provides, in its entirety:
(b) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown,
of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
5. The term "uncharged misconduct" appears to have been coined by Pro-
fessor Imwinkelied. See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1996). The term will be used in this Article, but its
scope must be understood. "Uncharged misconduct" refers to other crimes,
wrongs, or acts committed by a person currently alleged to have committed the
conduct concerning which the criminal charge or other claim has been brought.
Those other crimes, wrongs, or acts might well have been the subject of crimi-
nal charges, but because they are not the subject of the current case, they are
treated as "uncharged." Though "uncharged misconduct evidence" is therefore
a bit awkward, the term has caught on. A search of the Westlaw
"ALLCASES" database in July 2000, produced 365 reported decisions con-
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The same uncharged misconduct evidence, however, is almost
always relevant for a different-and impermissible-purpose: to
prove the character of the person and from that fact, the person's be-
havior on the relevant occasion. Thus, when offering uncharged
misconduct evidence on a motive theory, the party should anticipate
an objection, and should be prepared to demonstrate that the evi-
dence proves motive without requiring an inference of the person's
character, and that the probative value of the evidence justifies its
admission despite the risk of unfair prejudice.
The rule is thus easy to state: The court may admit uncharged
misconduct evidence when it tends to show a relevant motive other
than through an inference of character. The difficulty is to determine
the types of inferences sanctioned by the rule and the types forbid-
den. Much power rests in the hands of trial judges, subject to appel-
late oversight. Under-inclusiveness leads to the exclusion of too
much relevant evidence, making the truth-determination function of
the trial more difficult to serve. Over-inclusiveness creates great
danger of unfair prejudice, which can lead both to inaccurate truth-
determination and fundamental unfairness. The controversy about
the scope of the rule is underscored by this fact: The "other crimes,
wrongs, or acts" rule, in its entirety, has been the subject of more ap-
peals than any other evidence rule.7 A good-sized chunk of those
cases concern "motive.138
taining the phrase.
6. Wigmnore wrote that "the fact that the circumstance offered involves
also another crime by the defendant charged is in itself no objection, if the cir-
cumstance is relevant [to show motive]." 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 389, at 330 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter WIGMORE
(1940)].
7. See IMWINKELRJED, supra note 5, § 1:04, at 18 ("The admissibility of
uncharged misconduct evidence is the most frequently litigated evidentiary is-
sue on appeal."). Imwinkelried reports that a mid-1980s Westlaw search of
key numbers relating to uncharged misconduct evidence (157K369, 157K370,
157K371) revealed 11,607 state cases and 1894 federal cases. See id. In July
2000, the same search revealed 17,120 state cases and 4860 federal cases.
8. Of the more than 17,000 state cases uncovered by the July 2000, West-
law search, nearly 6000 fell into key number 157K371 (acts showing intent,
malice, or motive); of the nearly 5000 federal cases, more than 1600 fell into
that category.
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The purpose of this Article is to examine closely the use of un-
charged misconduct evidence to prove motive. The problem with
motive, as with all other theories under the "other crimes, wrongs, or
acts" rule, is always the same: Does the relevance of the evidence to
the case depend on the application of a character inference-an in-
ference as to the person's character-based propensity to behave in a
particular way or possess a particular state of mind? If the chain of
inferences leading from the evidence to the fact it is offered to prove
requires a character inference, the evidence is inadmissible. 9 If it
does not, it is potentially admissible. 10 Exactly when the evidence
passes this threshold test is a complex and controversial question,
and exposition of a complex problem can always benefit from a good
framing story. Ours is provided by the recent case of United States
v. Cunningham."
Constance Cunningham, a nurse, was charged in connection
with the theft of the controlled substance Demerol, a pain killer, from
a locked hospital cabinet. The drug had been contained in syringes.
In police interviews, Cunningham and the other four nurses who had
access to the cabinet all denied tampering with the syringes. Cun-
ningham admitted, however, that she had once been addicted to
Demerol, and a urine test result was consistent with recent Demerol
use.
12
9. The general proposition is stated in Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a):
"Evidence of a person's character or trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion...
FED. R. EVID. 404(a). The principle is applied to the matter at issue in Rule
404(b), which states: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admis-
sible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
10. I say the evidence is "potentially" admissible because the absence of a
character inference does not automatically make the evidence admissible. The
court must also determine that the evidence is not overly prejudicial, for exam-
ple. See FED. R. EVID. 403; Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-
91 (1988) (stating that the trial court must assess "whether the probative value
of similar acts [of] evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for un-
fair prejudice").
11. 103 F.3d 553 (7thCir. 1996).
12. See id. at 555.
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At trial, the court permitted the prosecution to present evidence
that four years earlier, Cunningham had been addicted to Demerol,
that she had stolen the substance from the hospital at which she then
worked, that as a result of her theft, her nurse's license had been sus-
pended, that her license was reinstated subject to her agreement to
submit to periodic drug tests, and that she had falsified the results of
some of those tests. The court excluded evidence that she had been
convicted of the Demerol theft.13 The prosecution's theory was that
Cunningham remained addicted to the drug, and had stolen it to feed
her addiction. The evidence of her earlier addiction, theft of Deme-
rol, suspension from practice, and falsification of test results was of-
fered to demonstrate that Cunningham's addiction gave her a motive
to steal the drug, that she is more likely to have acted on that motive
than one who did not suffer such addiction, and that she was there-
fore the person who stole the drug from the locked cabinet.
The jury convicted Cunningham,14 and she appealed, in part be-
cause of the court's alleged error in admitting this evidence. On ap-
peal, a unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed in an opin-
ion by Judge Richard Posner. The court first stated the general
proposition that a person's prior conduct could not be offered "for
the purpose of showing a propensity to act in accordance with the
character indicated by that conduct."' 5  The question, then, was
whether the evidence was relevant to Cunningham's guilt on some
basis that did not require an inference as to her character. The court
answered that although "propensity" and "motive" sometimes over-
lap, creating danger of jury misuse,' 6 in this instance, the evidence
13. See id. at 556.
14. See id. at 555. Specifically, Cunningham was convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994), "tampering with a consumer product 'with reckless
disregard for the risk that another person will be placed in danger of death or
bodily injury and under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
such risk."' Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a)).
15. Id. at556.
16. See id. at 556-57 ("The greater the overlap between propensity and mo-
tive, the more careful the district judge must be about admitting under the ru-
bric of motive evidence that the jury is likely to use instead as a basis for infer-
ring the defendant's propensity, his habitual criminality, even if instructed not
to.").
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did not violate the character rule:
We do not have a complete overlap between evidence of
propensity and evidence of motive in this case. Most peo-
ple don't want Demerol; being a Demerol addict gave Cun-
ningham a motive to tamper with the Demerol-filled sy-
ringes that, so far as appears, none of the other nurses who
had access to the cabinet in which the syringes were locked
had. No one suggests that any of the five nurses might have
wanted to steal Demerol in order to resell it rather than to
consume it personally. Because Cunningham's addiction
was not to stealing Demerol but to consuming it, this case is
like [People v. Moreno, 61 Cal. App.3d 688, 132 Cal. Rptr.
569 (1976)], where the defendant's sexual fetish supplied
the motive for his stealing women's underwear, and [Peo-
ple v. McConnell, 335 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)],
where the defendant's drug addiction supplied the motive to
rob--he needed money to buy drugs. Cunningham was in a
position to steal her drug directly.'
7
The trial court thus did not err in admitting the evidence. The Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed her conviction.' 8
Whether the Cunningham court reached the proper result de-
pends on whether it correctly construed the limits of the motive the-
ory. In this Article, I attempt to explore those limits in detail. Part I
describes the meaning and uses of motive in evidence law, and ana-
lyzes the overlap between it and other accepted theories for admis-
sion of uncharged misconduct, particularly that of "plan." Part II
discusses the degree of similarity required to justify admissibility of
uncharged misconduct evidence to prove motive, and analyzes the
importance of both the probative value of the uncharged misconduct
evidence and the need for similarity as a factor weighing in the ad-
missibility determination. Part III discusses the use of motive to
prove: (1) the identity of the actor who committed the act at issue in
the case; (2) that the charged act occurred; and (3) that a person acted
with a mental state required for the charged act. Some of these uses
17. Id. at 557.
18. See id.
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of motive clearly avoid the character problem, while others do not.
Part IV returns to Cunningham, analyzing the case in light of the
foregoing material Part V contains a suggestion for clarifying the
motive theory and for reforming the law.
I. THE MEANING AND USES OF "MOTIVE" IN EVIDENCE LAW
Motive is a state of mind. A general dictionary defines it as
"something that prompts a person to act in a certain way or that de-
termines volition," and equates the term with inducement and incen-
tive.' 9 Wigmore classified "motive" as a desire or emotion and
treated it along with evidence of "feeling" and "passion." 20 Wright
and Graham assume that the "other crimes rule" uses the term motive
"in the generally accepted sense of an emotion or state of mind that
prompts a person to act in a particular way; an incentive for certain
volitional activity.",21 A turn-of-the-century court defined motive as
"the moving power which impels to action for a definite result."2
Another source defines motive in the relevant context as "an in-
ducement or state of feeling that impels and tempts the mind to in-
dulge a criminal act," 23 and notes that emotions such as hostility and
jealousy can be the source of motives to act in a particular way.
2 4
When it is defined in these similar ways, motive appears distinct
from other states of mind that might be at issue or relevant in a par-
ticular case, such as intent.2 It would also appear to be distinct from
19. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 871 (rev. ed. 1979).
20. See 2 WIGMORE (1940), supra note 6, § 385, at 327.
21. 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH V. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5240, at 479 (1978).
22. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 296 (N.Y. 1901).
23. M.C. Sough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41
IOWA L. REv. 325, 328 (1956); see also Clinton J. Morgan, Note, Admissibilin'
in Criminal Prosecutions of Proof of Other Offenses as Substantive Evidence,
3 VAND. L. REv. 779, 779 (1950) ("Motive has been defined as 'an induce-
ment, or that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge the criminal act."'
(quoting People v. Fitzgerald, 50 N.E. 846, 847 (N.Y. 1898))).
24. See Sough & Knightly, supra note 23, at 328 (citing State v. Browman,
182 N.W. 823 (Iowa 1921) (discussing motive for homicide)).
25. "Intent spells purpose to use a particular means to obtain a desired end,
whereas motive supplies the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to
indulge the criminal intent" Id. (citing Jones v. State, 68 So. 690, 694 (Ala.
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the state of mind of one who possesses a "plan" that includes the
charged act. The distinction can be illusory, however, when one
carefully considers the chain of reasoning under which the evidence
is offered. As Wright and Graham note:
For example, the person moved to act by a particular mo-
tive may form an explicit plan to accomplish his purpose;
and once the act has been completed, knowledge of the
motive may lead us to infer that the act was done with the
intent of reaching the goal implied by the motive. Thus
evidence that a person acted in accordance with a particular
plan may permit us to infer back to the motive that pro-
duced the plan and forward to the intent with which a sub-
sequent act was carried out. It is not surprising, then, to
find the same sort of evidence being admitted under each of
these three different categories.
2 6
Thus, when one has a reason to act in a certain way, it is just as easy,
and accurate, to state that the person had a "motive" to act in a cer-
tain way as it is to state that the person developed the "intent" to be-
have that way, or developed a "plan" to do so. In all three cases, the
inference flows from the initial reason. Thus, a person charged with
arson in burning a building to collect insurance proceeds could be
said to have had a motive to burn the building for that reason, and
also to have had a plan to do so. Obviously, the evidence also dem-
onstrates that the person acted with intent, rather than by accident, in
causing the fire. Evidence of other insured properties burned by de-
fendant potentially would be admissible on any of the three theories
if, for example, defendant denies committing the charged offense, or
claims the fire began accidentally.2 7
Crim. App. 1915)).
26. 22 WRIGHT & GR-AM, supra note 21, § 5240, at 479-80. This
blending of categories has been noted for some time. To quote an influential
early twentieth century New York decision: "In the popular mind intent and
motive are not infrequently regarded as one and the same thing. In law there is
a clear distinction between them" Molineux, 61 N.E. at 296.
27. See, e.g., State v. Shindell, 486 A.2d 637 (Conn. 1985) (holding that in
prosecution for arson, evidence that defendant and his agents had attempted to
bum other insured buildings was admissible to prove continuing plan of which
charged crime was a part).
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The facts of Hazel v. United States2 8 further illustrate the over-
lap between motive and plan. Defendant was charged with assault
with intent to kill while armed and carrying a pistol without a li-
cense. To prove that defendant was the person who shot the victim,
the prosecution offered evidence that the two were involved in an
illegal drug operation, and that they were engaged in an ongoing
violent battle caused by each suspecting the other of stealing drugs.
The court held the evidence admissible under both the "motive" and
"common scheme or plan" theories.29 Both theories apply logically
to the facts of Hazel; it is equally logical to infer that defendant was
motivated by his suspicions to attack the victim as to say that defen-
dant's suspicions caused him to develop a plan to attack the victim.
Although this discussion will focus on the motive theory for
admission of uncharged misconduct to prove that an act occurred, the
identity of the actor, or the actor's state of mind, in many cases the
evidence could also be analyzed under other theories such as "plan."
Because motive cannot be proven directly, it is necessary to re-
sort to circumstantial evidence of its existence. As Wigmore stated,
circumstances may be offered as tending to show its exis-
tence; as when the argument is to the existence of this de-
sire in A (a) from an injury which B has done to A, or (b)
from A's outward conduct expressing such a desire, or (c)
from the prior or subsequent existence of such a desire.30
Thus, one must infer the existence of a motive from matters that
can be evidenced more or less directly, including other crimes,
wrongs, or acts committed by the person. From the existence of mo-
tive, to the behavior of a person on the occasion in question requires,
of course, a second inferential step.31 That step can lead to one of
three facts: (1) that the person is the one who committed the act in
question (identity); (2) that the act in question occurred [actus reus];
and (3) that the actor behaved with the required state of mind (in
criminal cases, [mens rea]).
28. 599 A.2d38 (D.C. 1991).
29. See id. at 40-43.
30. 2 WIGMORE (1940), supra note 6, § 385, at 327.
31. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 21, at 480-81 (noting the two-
step process).
447
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To begin with the use of uncharged misconduct to prove identity
by means of motive, suppose D is charged with the murder of V. D
claims not to have been involved. If the prosecution possesses evi-
dence that prior to the killing, D had been involved in a car theft, that
V had learned about the theft, and that V had threatened to reveal the
theft to the police, evidence of the theft could be admissible to prove
D's motive, and from that, D's possible behavior.32 In its most gen-
eral outlines, the reasoning would be as follows:
EVIDENCE: D stole a car, V was aware of the fact, and V
threatened to inform the police.
-- INFERENCE: D had a motive to prevent V from revealing
the theft to the police.
-)CONCLUSION: D murdered V to prevent V from reveal-
ing the theft to the police.
Notice that the same reasoning just described also tends to show
that a killing took place. If, therefore, D alleges that V was not
killed, but died of natural causes or from an accident unconnected to
D in any way. In that situation, the same evidence that identifies the
possible killer also suggests that a killing took place:
EVIDENCE: D stole a car, V was aware of the fact, and V
threatened to inform the police.
-)INFERENCE: D had a motive to prevent V from revealing
the theft to the police.
-)CONCLUSION: V died at the hands of another, and V did
not perish of natural causes or other cause unrelated to D.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 988 F.2d 1459, 1465 (6th Cir. 1993)
(indicating that defendant's involvement with theft activity is probative of de-
fendant's motive and intent).
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Uncharged misconduct evidence such as that in the hypothetical
murder case could also be used to show that a person acted with the
requisite intent. Thus, in the hypothetical case, if D admitted killing
Vbut claimed the killing was an accident, the theft evidence could be
admissible against D to prove D intended to kill V. The evidence of
Y's threat to reveal D's auto theft would give rise to an inference of a
motive to prevent the revelation, and existence of a motive would
suggest that in killing V, D acted intentionally rather than by acci-
dent. Thus:
EVIDENCE: D stole a car, V was aware of the fact, and V
threatened to inform the police.
-- INFERENCE: D had a motive to prevent V from revealing
the theft to the police.
--)CONCLUSION: D purposely killed V to prevent V from
revealing the theft to the police.
The inferential steps from the evidence to the existence of a mo-
tive, and then from the motive to the behavior at issue, can be strong
or weak. In some cases, the evidence gives rise to a strong inference
of a specific motive, and the likelihood of the motive gives rise to a
strong inference of action in conformity with that motive or the ex-
istence of a relevant state of mind. In other cases, one or both of the
inferences is hardly persuasive. One reason such an inference is of-
ten weak is that the motive is too general and too unlikely to be acted
upon to be useful. As an English commentator noted, "almost every
child has something to gain from the death of his parents, but rarely
on the death of a parent is parricide even suspected. 33 For purposes
of this Article, however, my concern is not with the strength of the
inferences, but with their logical validity in establishing a nonchar-
acter theory of relevance.
33. RUPERT CROSS, EVIDENCE 30 (3d ed. 1967) (citing NVILLIAM
MAWDESLEY BEST, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 384 (12th ed.
1922)).
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How does the motive reasoning differ from the forbidden char-
acter reasoning? To address this question, it is first important to de-
fine character. Unfortunately, there is no general agreement about
the precise meaning of the term. Some definitions equate character
with propensity,34 but at least for purposes of evidence law, this is
unwise. The primary reason evidence rules restrict character evi-
dence is the danger of unfair prejudice it engenders. A well estab-
lished principle of Anglo-American law is that a person is to be
judged according to what she has done on a particular occasion, not
according to her character.35 The admission of character evidence,
particularly evidence of a person's past misdeeds, threatens the sanc-
tity of the prohibition by inviting the fact finder to judge the person
rather than the person's charged acts. Only those aspects of a person
that bear on her morality create this danger. In a murder prosecution,
there is obviously no danger of trial by character in learning that the
defendant has a strong propensity to lock the doors of her car when
34. See, e.g., id. at 291 ("The term 'disposition' is employed to denote a
tendency to act, think or feel in a particular way."); WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 185 (1979), available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary (last visited Sept. 23, 2000) (listing disposition as synonym for
character); DICTIONARY.COM, at http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl
(last visited Sept. 23, 2000) (offering a definition of propensity as "disposition
to do good or evil").
35. In 1907, an English commentator wrote:
The English law of evidence ... will not permit a man's chances of
proving his innocence of the offence with which he is charged to be
prejudiced by a revelation to the jury of other misdeeds of a like char-
acter committed by him, or of any evidence the purport of which is to
proclaim him a "bad man," and as prima facie likely to be guilty of the
offence with which he is charged. The accused is on his trial for the
specific crime alleged in the indictment: he is not in the dock to an-
swer for his life-history.
Ernest E. Williams, Evidence to Show Intent, 23 L.Q. REv. 28, 30 (Frederick
Pollack ed., 1907). In United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir.
1980), the court wrote: "It is fundamental to American jurisprudence that 'a
defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he is."' (quoting United
States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)). For a discussion of the
history and foundations of the ban on character evidence, see David P. Leon-
ard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the
Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161 (1998) [hereinafter Leon-
ard, In Defense].
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she leaves it in a parking lot, or to turn on the television when she
comes home from work. The danger lies in the fact finder being
told, for example, that the defendant has acted violently in the past,
or that she is short-tempered. This is what the character evidence
rule forbids. The rule permitting evidence of uncharged misconduct
to prove a fact, by the same token, does not forbid all propensity in-
ferences, but only those based on character.36
Thus, from the perspective of the law of evidence, it is best to
conceive of character as a subset of propensity, embracing only
moral aspects of a person. As one author put it, "[a]ll character evi-
dence offered to show action in conformity with character is propen-
sity evidence, but not all propensity evidence is character evi-
dence. '37 This is consistent with many definitions of character that
can be found in the authorities. Wigmore, for example, defined
character as "the actual moral or psychical disposition or sum of
traits ....,, In an often quoted passage, McCormick defined it as
"a generalized description of one's disposition, or of one's disposi-
tion in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or
peacefilness. '' 39 The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence suggested that "character is defined as the kind of person
one is,"'4 and distinguished it from habit, which is certainly a form of
propensity evidence.4'
36. See Paul F. Rothstein, Intellectual Coherence in an Evidence Code, 28
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1259, 1264-65 (1995) (distinguishing types of propensities
ranging from morality tinged propensities known as character to specific,
nonmorality based propensities such as habits).
37. Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of
Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA L. REv. 777, 794 (1981).
38. 1AJOHNH. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 52, at
1148 (Peter Tillers ed., rev. ed. 1983).
39. CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
162, at 340-41 (1954).
40. FED. R. EviD. 405 advisory committee's note.
41. Quoting McCormick, the Advisory Committee wrote:
"Habit," in modem usage, both lay and psychological, is more specific
[than character]. It describes one's regular response to a repeated spe-
cific situation. If we speak of character for care, we think of the per-
son's tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life, in
business, family life, in handling automobiles and in walking across
the street. A habit, on the other hand, is the person's regular practice
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In determining whether certain reasoning from uncharged mis-
conduct evidence violates the character rule, therefore, it is necessary
to inquire whether the chain of inferences depends, at any point, on a
judgment about the person's moral tendencies. This is what the
character evidence rule forbids. Returning to the hypothetical theft-
murder case, one type of character-based reasoning would be as fol-
lows:
EVIDENCE: D stole a car, V was aware of the fact, and V
threatened to inform the police.
-)INFERENCE: D is the kind of person who would commit a
criminal act.
-)CONCLUSION: D acted in accordance with the criminal
character by murdering V.
By this reasoning, evidence of a person's criminal conduct is
used, first, to demonstrate a criminal character, and second, to prove
action in conformity. This is the type of reasoning forbidden by the
evidence rules.
Though motive reasoning also involves an inference of action in
conformity, it is different from character-based reasoning. Motive,
for one thing, is more specific than character, and its existence in a
given situation does not depend on the person's general moral fiber.
Under the right set of circumstances, even nonviolent people can
possess a motive to act violently, and honest people can have a mo-
tive to lie. Therefore, the first step in the reasoning-from the un-
charged misconduct to the existence of a motive-does not violate
the character evidence rule. We assume that a motive might exist
because any person might possess one under those specific circum-
stances.
of meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific type of con-
duct, such as the habit of going down a particular stairway two stairs
at a time, or of giving the hand-signal for a left turn, or of alighting
from railway cars while they are moving. The doing of the habitual
acts may become semi-automatic.
McCORMICK, supra note 39, § 162, at 341.
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This is not to say that motive evidence is always extremely spe-
cific in nature. It is possible both for a person to possess a motive to
act in a certain way toward a specific individual and to act in that
way toward a group of people. Hatred, for example, can be directed
toward a single individual or toward a group of people sharing some
common characteristic. Even this type of generalized motive is not
the same as character. However, the more generalized the motive in-
ference, the more like character it becomes, and the greater the dan-
ger of misuse.
One can rightly suggest that X has a motive to kill a homicide
victim, and that evidence of prior attempts to kill that person would
not violate the character evidence ban. But evidence that X had pre-
viously killed other people could hardly be justified as motive evi-
dence when offered to prove that X committed the charged homicide.
In such a case, the evidence almost certainly should be classified as
character and excluded. This point is well illustrated by virtually all
courts' traditional willingness in sexual assault cases to admit evi-
dence of uncharged sexual assaults with the same victim, but not
with others. In the latter situation, admission of the evidence on a
motive theory is fatally flawed.42
The dangers of defining motive too generally are vividly illus-
trated by the infamous prosecution of Leo Frank, superintendent of a
pencil factory, for the murder of a young girl who worked in the
factory.43 At trial, the prosecution called a janitor, who testified that
Frank asked him to keep watch while he spent time with the victim.
He testified that Frank appeared later, trembling, with rope in his
hands, and told the janitor that the girl died after he hit her when she
refused to "be with" him. According to the janitor, Frank then asked
him to help dispose of the body.4" The court also permitted the
42. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text
43. See Frankv. State, 80 S.E. 1016 (Ga. 1914).
44. See id. at 1020-21. The trial was conducted in a highly charged atmos-
phere. Frank, a Jevish man, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to
death. Before the sentence could be carried out, a mob lynched Frank. Later,
it became clear that the janitor had committed the crime. Frank was officially
pardoned seventy years after he was lynched. See Georgia Pardons Victim 70
Years After Lynching, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 12, 1986, at A16. For discussions of
the trial, its anti-Semitic overtones, and its meaning in history and jurispru-
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prosecution to elicit testimony from the janitor that Frank had often
asked the janitor to keep watch while Frank carried on illicit relations
with other female employees.
45
A majority of the Georgia Supreme Court held that this evidence
was admissible to prove both "motive" and "common scheme or
plan." The court's definition of motive was very broad, as indicated
by its explanation:
It is contended that proof of independent crimes was not
admissible on the trial of the accused for murder. A theory
of the state, which finds a basis in the evidence, was that the
murderer desired to have a sexual relation of some charac-
ter, natural or unnatural, with the deceased; that she resisted
his attempt for that purpose; that he struck her, not with the
intent at first to kill her, but in pursuance of his purpose
above mentioned; that the blow produced unconsciousness;
and that, in fear of her regaining consciousness and that his
criminality would be exposed, he choked his victim with a
cord. Here the question of whether the accused had a mo-
tive in regard to his conduct on that occasion which might
induce him to commit the homicide, in the effort to carry
out his purpose, was of the utmost materiality.
4 6
The motive, then, was one of "lechery," which the court noted was
common to the charged crime and the uncharged misconduct to
which the janitor testified.47
dence, see, e.g., JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE 471-72 (1984);
Clark J. Freshman, By the Neck Until Dead, AM. POL., Jan. 1988, at 29; Sym-
posiun, Introduction, What Ought to be Done-What Can be Done-ilen the
Wrong Person is in Jail or About to be Executed? An Invitation to a Multi-
Disciplined Inquiry, and a Detour About Law School Pedagogy, 29 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 1547, 1563-68 (1996); Clark Freshman, Note, Beyond Atomized Dis-
crimination: Use of Acts of Discrimination Against "Other" Minorities to
Prove Discriminatory Motivation Under Federal Employment Law, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 241 (1990).
45. See Frank, 80 S.E. at 1020-21.
46. Id. at 1022.
47. See id. at 1023. Clearly, the court felt the evidence was needed in order
to convict Frank-
There was no question that the girl was killed, and that her body was
found in the factory of which the accused was the superintendent.
There was evidence from which the jury could find that the killing oc-
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Clearly, the court in Frank had in mind a rather broad definition
of motive that differs little, if at all, from character. Frank's "mo-
tive" of "lechery" cannot be distinguished from a "lecherous" char-
acter. Two justices, in dissent, argued that the court's definition of
motive was too broad and not in accord with the authorities:
[A]ll evidence tending to show that the person of the de-
ceased had been violated was admissible to support the the-
ory that she was killed to prevent a discovery of the assault
curred on the second floor, on which was located the office where the
accused admitted that he was when the girl entered the building, went
to the office, and spoke to him. There was also evidence from which
it might be inferred that the person who committed the crime sought to
have some character of sexual relation, natural or unnatural, with the
girl. Practically all other persons were eliminated from suspicion ex-
cept the accused and Conley, the leading witness for the state. The
accused was a white man, married, and superintendent of the factory.
The witness was a negro employ6, who admitted that he drank intoxi-
cating liquors. Naturally it would be urged with great earnestness to
the jury that there could be no possible motive why the accused should
kill one of the employ~s of the factory, and that it would be improb-
able that he would indulge in lechery in his office or in his place of
business, while the negro sweeper would be more likely to do so.
Thus the question, not whether some unknown criminal had a lecher-
ous motive, but whether or not the accused had a lecherous motive
which might lead to the effort to accomplish it upon the girl, and, upon
her resistance, then to murder, was vitally involved. The question
would naturally be asked: What motive was there to prompt the ac-
cused to commit the act? The evidence tended to show a practice,
plan, system, or scheme on the part of the accused to have lascivious
or adulterous association with certain of his employds and other
women at his office or place of business, in which place the homicide
occurred. Some of these acts were shown specifically to have oc-
curred not long before the homicide, and others must have taken place
at no great distance of time, because Conley was only employed at the
factory a little more than two years. It tended to show a motive on the
part of the accused, inducing him to seek to have criminal intimacy
with the girl who was killed, and, upon her resistance, to commit mur-
der to conceal the crime. There was not only evidence of the practice
of the accused with other women, but during the trial there was also
introduced evidence tending to show that in pursuance of his general
practice he made advances toward the deceased. We think that the
evidence was admissible, both on the subject of motive and of plan,
scheme, or system, and as tending to show identity.
id. at 1026-27.
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that had been committed upon her. But . . . evidence of
prior lascivious transactions by the defendant with other
women with their consent was not relevant, either to show
that the defendant assaulted the deceased for the purpose of
having some sort of sexual relation with her, or to prove
that he had a motive for killing her, notwithstanding the de-
fendant may have been engaged in the other libidinous acts
a[t] or near the same place where the homicide occurred.
To our minds the evidence in the case utterly failed to show
any logical connection between the other lecherous acts of
the defendant with different women . . . and the assault
made upon the deceased and the killing of her to prevent its
disclosure.48
Thus, the dissenting judges recognized that the concept of common
motive seen by the majority is not a valid theory,
unless the expression "common motive" as used is to be
taken to mean substantially the same as "like motive" or
"similar motive"; and that it does not have this meaning ap-
pears from numerous decisions holding that proof of extra-
neous crimes, even in cases involving what is commonly
called "sexual offenses". . . , is not admissible, unless the
offense was between the same parties.49
In Frank, the other crimes evidence should not have been ad-
mitted if the rule excluding evidence of character is to be maintained.
That the case occurred in a different time and under different social
circumstances than those prevailing today must not diminish the
level of diligence courts show in evaluating a purported "motive"
theory for admission of uncharged misconduct evidence.
Thus, motive and character can be difficult to distinguish. The
court in Cunningham, with which this analysis began, recognized as
much when it wrote of an "overlap" between "propensity" and mo-
tive in certain situations. ° The more "overlap" there is in a given
48. Id. at 1037 (Fish, C.J., & Breck, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1041 (Fish, C.J., & Breck, J., dissenting).
50. See United States v. Cunninghan, 103 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1996).
The Cunningham court suggested that "motive" and "propensity" (character)
overlap when the crime is motivated by a taste for engaging in that
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case, the greater the danger the fact finder will misuse the evidence,
and the more cautious the trial judge must be in deciding on admis-
sion or exclusion.5' Many factors can make the distinction between
motive and character difficult to draw, but generally speaking, the
more specific the motive, the less danger will exist in admission of
the evidence. To take just one pair of possibilities, consider a case in
which D, a person of one racial group, is charged with the murder of
V, a person of another group. D admits killing V but claims the act
was unintentional. Uncharged misconduct evidence tending to show
that D hated V as an individual (a past violent act toward V, for ex-
ample) would carry significant probative value on the question of
D's state of mind in killing V Though the jury might misuse the
evidence by considering it for its tendency to prove D's bad charac-
ter, it is not very likely that the jury will misuse it in this way. If,
however, the uncharged misconduct evidence tended only to show a
hatred of people of V's racial group, for example, a past act of vio-
lence toward another member of that group, and not of V specifi-
cally; that evidence usually would have significantly less probative
value for its permissible use, such as motive, and would carry very
real risk of the jury's use of the evidence for character purposes.
The second leap in the inferential chain-from motive to con-
duct or state of mind-is also problematic. What generalization
would support such a conclusion? Remember that the rules only for-
bid propensity inferences based on character,52 which tend to be gen-
eralized inferences about the person (the person is a "violent" type,
for example). If there is a legitimate theory to explain this rule, per-
haps it resides in the specificity of the propensity that can be in-
volved in the case of motive. When one acts on a specific motiva-
tion, the behavior is in response to a narrow stimulus. In the theft-
murder hypothetical discussed earlier, 53 if defendant committed the
act of murder, it was in response to a specific problem created by a
crime or a compulsion to engage in it (an "addiction!'), rather than by a
desire for pecuniary gain or for some other advantage to which the
crime is instrumental in the sense that it would not be committed if the
advantage could be obtained as easily by a lawful route.
51. See id. at 556-57.
52. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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narrow set of circumstances; the possibility of being charged with a
crime as a result of a specific person's revelation of that crime to the
authorities. Arguably, at least, to make the inference we need not
ask whether defendant possesses a violent character, nor is the infer-
ence based on the sorts of general motivations that might affect all
people.5 4 We need only note the possibility that any person with this
specific motive is more likely to act on the motive than is a randomly
chosen person without such a motive. 55 As such, the likelihood of
our inferring defendant's commission of the act is based not on the
strength or weakness of defendant's moral character, but on the
strength or weakness of defendant's motive. Perhaps an analogy to
habit is in order. If habit, as McCormick asserted, is "one's regular
response to a repeated specific situation," 56 and if we can base an as-
sessment of a person's actions on the occasion in question on the
force of the person's habit, then perhaps we can do the same with the
strength of the person's motive.
54. One author has stressed the need for evidence of a specific motive:
[T]he relationship between the other act and the crime for which the
defendant is charged must be singularly interwoven. A general mo-
tive, such as greed or lust, shared by all with similar drives, is insuffi-
cient. For if the motive of greed were sufficient to establish the inde-
pendent relevance required by [the rule], any time a person is charged
with doing something criminal to acquire a pecuniary gain, ... any act
in which he has evinced a similar state of mind would be admissible.
So, too, would any lustful act be admissible against a defendant
charged with a sexual crime. There should be more. There should be
some connexity between this defendant and this crime. It should be
some motive sufficiently unique that it points unerringly at this defen-
dant.
Golden, supra note 1, at 207.
55. "By the introduction of evidence which provides a motive, the prosecu-
tion is able to establish the defendant was more likely to have committed the
crime than a person without a similar motive." Id. at 206. See also GEORGE
W. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 33-34 (1974), stating:
If the defendant had a particular reason to accomplish a crime and the
crime was effected, proof of defendant's motive renders more prob-
able the fact that he was the actor. In order to have independent rele-
vance, the motive reflected by other crimes should be factually pecu-
liar to the victim and the crime charged.
56. MCCORMICK, supra note 39, § 162, at 340.
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The crucial question in any case is precisely how uncharged
misconduct evidence can tend to show motive and thus demonstrate
the possibility of any of the following conclusions:
(1) Defendant committed the act at issue.
(2) The act at issue, which defendant claims did not oc-
cur, did indeed occur.
(3) Defendant, who admits committing the act at issue but
denies intent, in fact intended to commit the act.
To return to the first iteration of the theft-murder hypothetical, in
which D denies being the person who murdered V, the specific way
in which the motive-based reasoning permits us to move from the de-
fendant's motive to her actions is as follows:
MOTIVE INFERENCE: D had a motive to kill V.
57
GENERALIZATION: People with motives to act in a par-
ticular way are somewhat more likely to do so than are people
without such motives.
->CONCLUSION: D committed the murder.
In theory, at least, this reasoning differs from the generalization
supporting the character-based reasoning:
INFERENCE FROM THEFT: D has a criminal character.
GENERALIZATION: People with criminal characters have a
tendency to commit crimes.
->CONCLUSION: D committed the murder.
The distinction between the reasoning from motive and the reasoning
from character thus can be described fairly easily, even if it is diffi-
cult to apply. Motive theory is distinct from the character theory
57. The motive will have been supplied by the uncharged misconduct evi-
dence.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
because the jury is simply being asked to compare the defendant who
has a motive to a person who lacks such a motive. On that basis, the
jury need not resort to the character inference because the inference
supporting motive-arising from a universal human tendency-of-
fers a chance to consider the likelihood of defendant doing the act as
opposed to anybody else without a motive, and it would seem that
the evidence has at least some genuine probative value for that pur-
pose. Nevertheless, intellectually understanding the distinction does
not mean it will be followed. It remains to be seen whether juries
will understand the distinction, but nevertheless employ the forbid-
den character inference. The temptation to do so can be very strong,
requiring the court to assess the dangers with care.
Consider, next, whether this reasoning also holds true when the
motive evidence is offered either to prove that the act at issue did
take place, or that defendant who admits the act but denies the es-
sential mental element did indeed act with that state of mind. In
those situations, the reasoning once again involves a comparison
between a person with a motive and a person without one. Returning
to the theft-murder hypothetical, and positing now that the defendant
denies acting with the intent required by the crime of murder, a plau-
sible motive-based inferential chain would be as follows:
MOTIVE INFERENCE: D had a motive to kill V.
GENERALIZATION: Normal people with a motive to kill a
person are more likely to have killed that person intentionally
than people who kill that person without a motive to do so.
->CONCLUSION: D's killing of Vwas intentional.
This reasoning is plausible, and once again does not require an infer-
ence from character (though as before, it does involve a propensity
inference). Similarly, no character inference is required when evi-
dence of motive is offered to prove that a particular act occurred,
though the generalization supporting the inference is somewhat dif-
ferent. In the example, if D claims that there was no murder--that V
committed suicide, for example-evidence that D had a motive to
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kill V makes it somewhat more likely that D acted than it would be
without the evidence. Here, the reasoning would be as follows:
MOTIVE INFERENCE: D had a motive to kill V.
GENERALIZATION: An event is more likely to occur if a
person has a motive to cause the event than if no person has
such a motive.
->CONCLUSION: D killed V.
Here, the generalization does not seek a comparison between D (pos-
sessing a motive) and any other person without a motive. It is simply
an assessment of the likelihood of suicide given another person's
motive to kill the victim, as compared with the likelihood of suicide
in the absence of another person's motive to kill. Once again, the
fact finder is not asked to infer D's actions from D's character, but
fromD's motive to act. And if motives are normal aspects of human
psychology and behavior, and not the kinds of "character" traits fal-
ling within the prohibition, the evidence is potentially admissible.
Despite the theoretical difference between the motive theory and
the character theory, the danger that the jury will misuse the evidence
always lurks when uncharged misconduct evidence is the source of
the motive inference. In fact, the danger of jury misuse is considera-
bly greater than with some other uses of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence, where the noncharacter inference is more intuitively accessi-
ble. When the motive theory is involved, the fact finder frequently
will be tempted to enter the realm of the individual's own mind and
souL- of the depth of the person's inhibitions against antisocial or il-
legal behavior. If we accept the proposition that characteristics in-
ternal to the individual supply the necessary inhibitions, then it is
most difficult to maintain a distinction between such a concept and
that of character.58 The temptation to consider the evidence not only
58. One author has noted that traditionally prohibited propensity inferences
ask the fact finder "to make an 'individualized' propensity inference in the
sense that the defendant's propensity... is not a propensity shared by the
populace at large." Kuhns, supra note 37, at 783.
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in relation to humanity as a whole but also as an indicator of the bad
character of the defendant is all but overwhelming in many cases.
Jurors will most naturally want to ask not simply whether defendant
had a motive and acted or resisted, as would any human being, but
whether there is something about the defendant that makes it more
likely that she acted on the motive. To use the uncharged miscon-
duct as a predictor of defendant's actual conduct on the charged oc-
casion would, however, violate the character evidence prohibition.
In sum, it seems appropriate to conclude that the distinction
between character-based propensity and motive-based propensity is
subtle but theoretically valid. In line with existing practice, there-
fore, evidence of uncharged misconduct may be admitted when of-
fered to prove that the person had a motive that might have affected
her conduct or state of mind. Still, there is the strong possibility that
the jury will resort to the forbidden character logic when it is more
compelling: that a person who would steal would also kill, or, more
persuasively in this case, that a person who would steal would have
fewer inhibitions against killing to prevent disclosure than would a
person who does not steal. Thus, the need for case-by-case analysis
of the permissible reasoning and for careful balancing of the strength
of that reasoning against the risk of unfair prejudice is particularly
great. Unfortunately, as with other uses of uncharged misconduct
evidence, courts often admit evidence without careful balancing,
which at times leads to error and injustice.59
II. "MoTIvE" IN CONTEXT
Because motive is not an ultimate fact, evidence of motive will
always be offered as one of the inferences along a chain of reasoning
leading to an ultimate fact. There are essentially three possibilities.
59. Wright and Graham caution:
Rather than search the digests for a category into which the proposed
use can be crammed, courts should examine the complete chain of in-
ferences necessary to make the evidence of other crimes relevant and
admit or exclude the evidence on the basis of whether it is or is not of-
fered to prove some conduct of the accused and whether it does or
does not require an inference as to his character.
22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 21, § 5240, at 477-78.
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Motive can be relevant to determining (1) whether an act took place;
(2) whether the person claimed to have committed the act in fact did
so; or (3) whether the person who committed the act did so with the
mental state, if any, required for the charge or claim.60 The cases
demonstrate that evidence of uncharged misconduct has been admit-
ted widely to prove each of these three types of facts.
Although the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence is
a highly fact-sensitive matter, several themes tend to recur through-
out the cases. Before turning to the ultimate issues for which motive
evidence might be offered, it is useful to consider several of these re-
curring issues as they apply to the motive theory. First is the degree
of similarity required between the uncharged and the charged con-
duct.6' Next is the importance of the probative value of the evidence,
both in general and in light of other evidence offered or available in
the case.62
A. Importance of Similarity of Charged and Uncharged Misconduct
When uncharged misconduct evidence is offered on a motive
theory, the similarity between the uncharged act and the act in ques-
tion is of no consequence.63 Applicability of the various theories
making motive relevant does not depend on the nature of the other
act itself, but on the light the act sheds on the actor's state of mind or
60. See 22 id. at 480 (stating these three potential uses of motive evidence).
61. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 64-80 and accompanying text
63. See United States v. Shriver, 842 F.2d 968, 974 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating
that when bad acts offered to show motive, similarity is not an appropriate re-
quirement); CAROL CAMPAIGNE ET AL., 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 425 (1994)
("To prove motive, evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts
may not have to be similar to the offense with which the accused is charged in
order to be admissible."); Golden, supra note 1, at 206 (when uncharged mis-
conduct evidence is offered to prove motive, "there is no need for any degree
of similarity between the uncharged and charged acts"); Morgan, supra note
23, at 780 (stating that similarity is not a factor where evidence introduced to
prove motive); Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Admissibili.v of Evidence of Ac-
cused's Drug Addiction or Use to Show Motive for Theft of Property Other
Than Drugs, 2 A.L.R.4TH 1298, 1300 (1980) C"It is generally recognized that
in criminal prosecutions where the motive of the accused is important and ma-
terial a somewhat broader range of evidence is permitted in establishing a de-
fendant's motive than is allowed in support of other issues.").
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conduct. Thus, it is not necessary for the proponent of uncharged
misconduct, when offered to prove motive, to demonstrate any par-
ticular degree of similarity between the act giving rise to motive and
the fact it is offered, ultimately, to prove.
B. Importance of Probative Value of the Evidence to Prove
Existence of Motive
When evidence of uncharged misconduct is offered to prove
motive, some courts have wisely noted the importance of examining
the strength of the motive evidence, both as a general proposition and
in light of the other evidence offered or available in the case. Gener-
ally speaking, the less probative value an act of uncharged miscon-
duct adds to a case, the more likely it is that the prejudice it might
cause substantially outweighs the probative value, justifying exclu-
sion. These points are best explained through illustrations.
In Farris v. People,64 an 1889 Illinois case, the defendant was
charged with the murder of his ex-wife's new husband. The trial
court allowed the prosecution to offer evidence of the defendant's
rape of his ex-wife about a half-hour after the killing to prove that he
acted with a motive of jealousy in the killing, in turn evidencing his
intent in committing that act. The court held that the circumstances
of the defendant's shooting of the victim were sufficient to show in-
tent. The court stressed the need in criminal cases to confine evi-
dence as much as possible to avoid misleading the jury or unfairly
surprising the defendant.65 It recognized that the evidence could be
offered in some cases to prove such matters as guilty knowledge, ab-
sence of accident, motive, or identity, but that in this case it held that
the connection between the killing and the subsequent rape was
tenuous at best:
[T]here is no evidence whatever connecting the two acts, or
tending to show wherein the commission of the rape had
any bearing upon or tendency to explain the commission of
the homicide; and therefore, if it be held that evidence of
the one tended to prove the other, it must be upon the
64. 21 N.E. 821 (Ill. 1889).
65. See id. at 822-23.
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ground that there is some natural or obvious connection
between the two acts. Did the proof of rape in this case
tend to prove the defendant guilty of murder? What ele-
ment in the crime of murder was wanting when this evi-
dence was admitted? Or what fact in evidence, necessary to
make out the crime of murder, did it tend to strengthen, or
corroborate? It seems clear to us that these are questions
which puzzle the legal mind, and can only be answered so
as to sustain the admissibility of the evidence in question, if
at all, by drawing exceedingly fine distinctions.
66
The trial judge's decision to admit the evidence on the ground that it
tended to establish a motive was therefore erroneous:
In the first place, under the facts proved, it was not neces-
sary to prove a motive .... [I]n this case the state, having
shown the deliberate shooting, under circumstances show-
ing both express and implied malice, proof of motive was
not necessary to a conviction; and, while the prosecution
doubtless had the right to add [to] that proof by competent
evidence, it may well be doubted whether testimony so
strongly calculated to prejudice the jury against the defen-
dant should have been admitted, even though it tended to
prove a motive .... But no theory has been suggested
upon which it can be said that the commission of the crime
of rape tended to show a motive for the homicide; and...
we can discover no rational connection between the two
acts, whereby it can be inferred that desire, purpose or in-
tent to commit the crime upon Mrs. McGehee could have
influenced the mind of defendant to take the life of de-
ceased. To so hold seems to us not only illogical, but un-
natural and unreasonable.67
Concerned that the jury might have been prejudiced by "the disgust-
ing and abhorrent facts attendant upon the commission of that most
brutal and infamous crime given in detail," 68 thus contributing to the
66. Id. at 823.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 824.
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jury's verdict and sentence of death, the court held that admission of
the evidence constituted reversible error.69
Courts have also required that evidence of the motive be more
than speculative. In United States v. Madden,70 for example, defen-
dant's robbery conviction was reversed where the government had
been permitted to present evidence of defendant's drug use to prove
motive, but had failed to show that his habit was significant and that
defendant did not have the financial means to support it.71 It is cru-
cial for the court to analyze the applicability of the theory to the facts
at hand, determine the strength of the motive evidence, and then to
weigh its probative value against its potential prejudice. In United
States v. Labansat,72 for example, where defendant was charged with
bank robbery, the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution to
present evidence of defendant's possession of drugs at the time of his
arrest.73 The court held:
The only evidence pertaining to drugs was that [defendant]
possessed marijuana, cocaine and heroin when he was ar-
rested. This alone is insufficient to support an inference of
financial need to establish a motive to rob a bank. Many
defendants who possess drugs are dealers whose very pos-
session of drugs diminishes, not enhances, any potential fi-
nancial need to rob a bank.74
69. See id.; see also People v. Fitzgerald, 50 N.E. 846, 846 (N.Y. 1898)
(holding in prosecution of pastor for arson in the burning of a parochial
schoolhouse, allegedly motivated by a desire to recover insurance proceeds
from which he could be paid, trial court should not have admitted evidence of
other misconduct including additional fires to which defendant may have been
connected.) In Fitzgerald, though the evidence related to prosecution's motive
theory, risk that the jury would lose sight of the essential issues in the mass of
collateral facts, together with interest in protecting defendant from having to
answer for all possible wrongdoings in his life, required exclusion. The court
also noted the speculative nature of evidence of other misconduct.
70. 38 F.3d 747 (4th Cir. 1994).
71. See id. at 752; see also United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173, 175
(2d Cir. 1966) (holding that evidence of the defendant's lack of money and
drug addiction alone were too speculative to be admitted to show a motive to
steal).
72. 94 F.3d 527 (9th Cir. 1996).
73. See id.
74. Id. at 531. The court found the error harmless, however. See id.
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The strength of the first inference in the motive cases-from the un-
charged misconduct to the existence of a motive-is thus a crucial
part of the admissibility analysis.
Where motive to commit a crime can be proven without resort to
uncharged misconduct evidence, an examination of the need for the
evidence in light of the prejudice it might cause is especially appro-
priate. This was the case in United States v. Latouf s where defen-
dants were charged, inter alia, with scheming to bum a restaurant one
of them owned in order to collect insurance proceeds. 6 To prove
motive, the government offered evidence that Latouf had commented
to two of her employees that she wanted to have her house burned
down and that she would pay them $5000 to do so. On appeal, the
court stressed the need for careful balancing of probative value and
prejudicial impact," and held that admission of this evidence was er-
ror:
[O]ther proof was available to render the testimony of [the
employees] redundant and, therefore, the statements were
highly prejudicial. The government had ample evidence of
Latouf s financial problems to prove motive and plan ....
Thus, taking into consideration the other evidence available
to the government, it is clear that the statements were un-
needed and unduly prejudicial
7 8
Though the court held that the error was harmless,7 9 its point is well
taken. The availability of motive evidence that does not necessitate
exposing the jury to uncharged misconduct is an important factor in
determining the admissibility of the latter evidence.
The court should also exclude the evidence if the issue for which
the evidence is ultimately offered---whether it be actus reus, identity
of the actor, or relevant state of mind-is uncontested. Suppose,
75. 132 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1997).
76. See id. at 323.
77. See id. at 329.
78. Id. Contra Stanley v. State, 171 S.W.2d 406 (Tenn. 1943) (holding that
in prosecution for procuring the burning of a house, evidence that the defen-
dant carried fire insurance on the house for an amount greater than its value
was admissible to prove motive to defraud insurer).
79. See Latouf, 132 F.3d at 328.
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therefore, that in a murder prosecution, defendant admits killing the
victim but claims she was legally insane at the time. Because defen-
dant has conceded that she killed the victim, evidence that defendant
had a motive to kill the victim should not be admissible on the issues
of actus reus or identity. In addition, proof that the killing was in-
tentional would not weaken the insanity defense, as one may intend
an act but be unable to appreciate its unlawfulness or exercise the
proper control of her behavior at the time.80
IH. THE USES OF MoTIvE EVIDENCE: IDENTITY, AcTus REus,
AND RELEVANT STATE OF MIND
As noted previously, motive is not an ultimate fact in any crime,
claim, or defense. 81 The presence of a motive, however, can make
the existence of ultimate facts more likely. This part of the Article
will examine the use of motive evidence to prove identity, 82 whether
the act itself occurred,83 and a required state of mind. 84 As the fact
patterns will reveal, some uses of motive are easily distinguishable
from character, and, as a result, should generally be allowed, subject
to a proper limiting instruction. Other uses of motive are difficult to
distinguish from character and require considerably greater scrutiny.
80. Under the Model Penal Code, insanity is defined as a defect of mind
that causes the actor to lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the crimi-
nality of the act or to conform her conduct to the law's requirements. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01; 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 4.3, at 462-64 (1986). The Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994), tightened the insanity standard for
federal crimes by eliminating the "volitional" language of the Model Penal
Code standard. Under the new federal test, insanity requires proof that defen-
dant, as the result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreci-
ate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. See Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.S. § 17, Providing for
Insanity Defense in Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 118 A.L.R. FED. 265
(1994). Even under the new federal standard, the defendant's intent to commit
the act does not negate the insanity defense.
81. See supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 85-166 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 167-216 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 217-301 and accompanying text.
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A. The Use of Motive to Prove Identity
When an act has been committed, and the issue is whether a
particular individual, rather than another, is responsible, evidence
that the individual had a motive to act in that way is relevant. Gen-
erally, the evidence is offered to prove the identity of the act at issue
in the case, such as the killing in a homicide prosecution or the ques-
tioned transaction in a prosecution or civil action for fraud.85 The
reasoning behind the motive-to-identity theory is relatively
straightforward: A person who has a motive to act is somewhat more
likely to have acted than is a person without a motive. One type of
evidence from which that person's motive might be inferred is her
uncharged misconduct.
Although there is no limit to the fact patterns in which motive
evidence might be admissible to prove that a person committed an
act, there are some repeating scenarios. In each, we will assume that
the issue is identity rather than whether the act occurred at all or
whether the actor behaved with a required state of mind. As the dis-
cussion will show, the motive-to-identity theories reasoning in some
of these cases is relatively straightforward and does not threaten a
violation of the character rule. In others, it is much more difficult to
distinguish this use of "motive" from character evidence.
85. The motive-to-identity reasoning can also be applied to identify the per-
son who committed a different act that relates in some way to the identity of
the person who committed the act at issue (often the same person). Suppose,
for example, that a defendant is charged with murder. The prosecution's the-
ory is that the defendant, a homeless person with no legal means of support,
committed the murder to prevent the victim from identifying the defendant's
participation in a bank robbery to which the victim had been a witness. The
defendant denies involvement in either the uncharged bank robbery or the
murder. Evidence that the defendant is a heavy user of illegal drugs would be
admissible to prove defendant had a motive to participate in the bank robbery,
and from the existence of a motive, proof of defendant's actual participation.
That evidence would, in turn, shed light on the defendant's possible involve-
ment in the murder at issue by virtue of a motive to eliminate witnesses to the
bank robbery. The initial motive, therefore, evidenced not the ultimate flct,
the identity of the murderer, but an intermediate fact in a chain of inferences
that leads, eventually, to the charged crime.
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1. Evidence of uncharged misconduct suggesting enmity toward the
victim of the charged act
Perhaps the simplest example of motive-to-identity evidence is
of behavior tending to prove enmity toward the victim of the charged
crime. The cases have long recognized this theory. In the 1898
Idaho case of State v. Davis,86 for example, defendant Davis was
charged with the murder of Wilson.87 The case arose in the context
of a wider struggle between sheep herders and cattlemen for control
of land in the area. Davis was a cattleman, and Wilson was a sheep
herder.88 Davis asserted an alibi defense. 89 To prove that Davis
killed Wilson, the prosecution offered evidence that prior to the kill-
ing, defendant had repeatedly threatened the lives of sheep men, had
specifically threatened those who did not stay off a certain range, and
was involved in an attack on the camp of certain sheep herders.
90
The court held this evidence admissible to show a motive for defen-
dant to commit the charged crime, and thus, to prove the essential
element of identity. 91
Similarly, in State v. Halleck,92 defendant was charged with
burning several buildings on a single night. All of the buildings were
owned by one Rehberg. To connect defendant with the crime, the
prosecution offered evidence that on the night of the fire, defendant
stole a chicken from a nearby barn. Also, the prosecution offered
evidence that on the same night, Rehberg's watch-dog was poisoned
with strychnine-laced meat, and that when defendant was arrested,
defendant was found in possession of two pieces of meat poisoned
with strychnine and tied with twine. On post mortem examination,
strychnine-laced meat, paper, and twine were found in the dog's
stomach. This evidence was admitted over defendant's objection
that it was irrelevant and that it tended to prove crimes not charged in
86. 53 P. 678 (Idaho 1898).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 679-80.
89. See id. at 678-79.
90. The court gave a detailed account of the struggle and of defendant's
threats. See id. at 679-8 1.
91. See id. at 682.
92. 26 N.W. 572 (Wis. 1886).
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the information. 93 The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed defen-
dant's conviction, emphasizing first the probative value of and the
need for the evidence:
If the only object was to prove that the defendant commit-
ted these crimes, the evidence would have been improper,
except in order to show a motive for the commission of the
crime charged. In cases depending wholly on circumstan-
tial evidence, some motive or the malice of the defendant
towards the party injured may be shown as bearing upon the
question whether the defendant committed the crime
charged, as an important and pertinent fact or circumstance.
In this view, it was proper to show that the defendant poi-
soned the watch-dog of the person injured, which might
imply malice towards him and furnish a motive for the ar-
son. Or the dog might have been killed to prevent an alarm
before the consummation of the crime, or detection after-
wards. The killing of the dog by poisoned meat, and proof
that similar packages of poisoned meat were found on the
person of the accused, afforded important evidence of his
identity with the person who killed the dog, and that he was
present on the premises of Rehberg that night and about the
time the fire was set. These were facts and circumstance
bearing directly on the crime charged, and the proof of an-
other crime was only incidental to this main purpose.
94
93. See id. at 573.
94. Id.; see also Hazel v. United States, 599 A.2d 38 (D.C. 1991) (in prose-
cution for assault with intent to kill while armed and carrying a pistol without a
license, evidence of an ongoing violent battle between defendant and the vic-
tim over a period of time was admissible to prove motive, and from that, the
identity of the shooter on the charged occasion; "bad blood" between the de-
fendant and the victim, both involved in illegal drug operation, and arising
from the suspected theft of drugs, was evidence of motive that helped identify
the shooter, for further discussion of Hazel, see supra note 28 and accompa-
nying text); People v. Murphy, 32 N.E. 138 (N.Y. 1892) (in prosecution for ar-
son in burning a barn, evidence that other animals and property of the victim
were also destroyed on same night was admissible to show both identity of the
perpetrator and intent); State v. Hallock, 40 A. 51, 51-52 (Vt. 1899) (in arson
prosecution, evidence that about six weeks before the fire in the victim's barn,
defendant set fire to the same person's home, that defendant had predicted that
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The theory relied on by Davis and Halleck is clearly tenable,
and is not based on an inference from character. All people are sub-
ject to the highly motivational emotion of hatred, as well as similar
strong emotions. In the context of witness impeachment, for
example, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed
that a criminal defendant's right to inquire into the possible bias or
motive of prosecution witnesses is constitutionally protected.95
Thus, one should expect courts to admit such evidence routinely, and
only exclude it in the presence of substantial risk of unfair prejudice.
all of the victim's buildings would burn, and that defendant had tried to hire
other persons to bum the other buildings was admissible to show a motive on
defendant's part that connected him with the fire in question and to prove that
the subject fire was not accidentally set).
Contrary to the above cases, the court in State v. Smith, 106 P. 797 (Or.
1910), found error in the trial court's admission of evidence offered under this
type of motive-to-identity theory. Defendant, a cattle rancher, was charged
with arson for burning a sheep shearing shed owned by the victim Defendant
denied participation in the offense, despite testimony from his alleged accom-
plice that the two of them had committed the crime. To prove defendant's
participation, the trial court permitted the prosecution to present evidence that
not long after the charged crime, defendant and the accomplice committed
other acts against the victim's property, including placing poison near the
sheep, setting fire to a tent and other property used by the victim's herder, and
cutting wire from the victim's fence. On appeal, the court held the admission
to be error because the uncharged misconduct constituted a "separate and inde-
pendent offense subsequently perpetrated, and did not relate to the same prop-
erty [n]or were [they] connected in any manner by time, place, or circumstance
with the destruction by fire of the building in question.... ." Id. at 799.
The reasoning is erroneous. The victim's business threatened defen-
dant's financial interests, establishing a motive to act against the victim or his
business. Unless the rather substantial probative value of the evidence as
tending to show defendant's identity as a perpetrator was substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the court should have held that the
trial court acted properly in admitting the evidence.
95. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (holding that refusal
to permit defendant to establish bias was constitutional error); United States v.
Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (recognizing viability of bias impeachment method
despite lack of explicit mention in Federal Rules of Evidence); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (holding defendant's constitutional confrontation
right violated by trial court's refusal to permit defendant to inquire into bias of
prosecution witness; Court held that a witness's partiality is always relevant to
credibility); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931) (recognizing right,
later held to be grounded in the Constitution in Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129
(1968), to question prosecution witness to show bias).
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2. Evidence of uncharged misconduct suggesting motive of greed
Emotional states other than enmity toward the victim can also be
the source of a relevant motive. One such state is greed, and that
emotion has formed the basis of a long recognized route to admissi-
bility of uncharged misconduct evidence. An early and useful exam-
ple is People v. Wood,96 in which defendant was charged with the
poisoning murder of his sister-in-law. To prove that defendant
committed the crime in order to obtain the sister-in-law's property,
the prosecution offered evidence that at the same time he adminis-
tered the poison to her, he also gave it to her husband (defendant's
brother) and the couple's two children. This evidence supported the
motive theory, and thus the possibility that defendant was his sister-
in-law's killer.
Once again, this is a legitimate noncharacter theory. The evi-
dence in Wood was not offered to prove that defendant was an evil
person who would murder, but to show that he had a reason to kill,
which would make it more likely that he committed the crime than
would a person without a reason. Naturally, not all people with a
motive act on it, but people with a motive are more likely to act on it
than people without one.
Similarly, in State v. McCall,97 defendant was convicted, inter
alia, of first-degree murder. That the murder took place was a given;
defendant's defense was based on the claim that he was not involved
in the crime.98 To prove defendant's guilt, the prosecution offered
evidence of a plot in which defendant was involved to take over the
illegal drug business in the South Phoenix area.99 Over defendant's
objection, the trial court admitted the evidence, and this decision was
upheld. The court held that:
[The evidence] helped explain to the jury what appellant
meant when he told Mr. Merrill that he (appellant) was
"changing sides" to join Bracey and Hooper and would be
96. 3 Park Crim. 681 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858).
97. 677 P.2d 920 (Ariz. 1983).
98. Defendant also sought to have his trial severed from that of his co-
defendant. The appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to sever. See id.
at 925.
99. See id.
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living "life in the fast lane." We find such evidence prop-
erly admitted either as evidence of appellant's motive in
joining Bracey and Hooper in the Redmond murder or as
evidence completing the story for the jury. 100
Thus, the evidence demonstrated that defendant had a motive to
commit the crime. The existence of a motive, in turn, would tend to
make it somewhat more likely than it would be without the motive
that defendant did indeed take part in the murder.
3. Evidence of uncharged misconduct suggesting a need for or other
motive to obtain money
One recurring use of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove
motive, and from that, a person's commission of the relevant act,
arises in robbery and other property crime cases where the evidence
tends to show that defendant needed money and often, that defendant
was living beyond his or her means.' 0 ' In People v. Talaga,'°2 for
example, defendant was charged with armed robbery. To prove de-
fendant's participation in the crime, the prosecution asked defendant
on cross-examination whether he was a heroin addict. On appeal,
defendant claimed that evidence of his heroin addiction should have
been excluded. The court affirmed, holding that the evidence tended
to establish a motive for the crime charged, and that the motive, in
turn, "would tend to rebut defendant's contention that he was at
home and knew nothing of the charge made against him.''
0 3
As discussed previously, evidence of motive from uncharged
misconduct must be more than speculative. 10 4 In the cases involving
100. Id. at 926 (citation omitted).
101. See United States v. Saniti, 604 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
that evidence of defendant's $250 per day drug habit was admissible to prove
motive, and noting that "[e]vidence that tends to show that a defendant is liv-
ing beyond his means is of probative value in a case involving a crime result-
ing in financial gain").
102. 194 N.W.2d 462 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
103. Id. at 463; see also United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1069-70
(7th Cir. 1977) (in bank robbery prosecution, evidence that shortly after the
robbery, defendant asked government informer to purchase heroin for him was
admissible to prove defendant's motive for and participation in the robbery);
People v. McConnell, 335 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (similar).
104. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
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motive to obtain money, courts have been reluctant to admit evi-
dence where the inference of motive is weak. In United States v.
Mullings,10 5 for example, defendant was charged, inter alia, with
theft of property valued at more than $100. To prove motive and
thus participation in the crime, the trial court allowed the prosecution
to present evidence of defendant's meager take-home pay and that he
used narcotics. On appeal, the court held that admission of the evi-
dence was reversible error because there was no evidence to show
how often defendant used narcotics, what his habit cost him, or that a
shortage of money prevented him from obtaining the narcotics. At
most, the court held, the evidence showed that defendant might have
lacked money and thus might have had a motive to commit the
crime. 06 Many other similar cases can be found.107 The weaker the
inference of motive, the less probative the evidence on the ultimate
issue of identity, and the more likely the court should exclude the
evidence to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice. Facts such as the link
between the theft and the drug use, the need for the evidence, and the
presence or absence of evidence suggesting the defendant was short
of funds will be crucial 108
Another common fact pattern involves arson cases in which de-
fendant is alleged to have set the fire to collect insurance proceeds.
Cases have long recognized the admissibility of uncharged miscon-
duct to prove such a theory. In Commonwealth v. McCarthy,10 9 for
example, defendant was originally charged with three counts of ar-
son, one of which concerned the burning of a building owned by one
Gleason, and two of which concerned fires shortly before the other
105. 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966).
106. See id. at 175-76.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Madden, 38 F.3d 747, 752-54 (4th Cir. 1994)
(in prosecution for robbery, evidence of defendant's use of drugs was inadmis-
sible in the absence of direct evidence of defendant's financial need or drug
use extensive enough to suggest great expense); People v. Reid, 133 Cal. App.
3d 882, 184 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1982) (in prosecution for committing several rob-
beries, evidence that defendant was a drug user should not have been admitted
where there was no reasonable basis for inferring the monetary burden of de-
fendant's use). For discussion of cases admitting and excluding the evidence
in these types of prosecutions, see Landis, supra note 63.
108. See 67 AM. JUrL 2D Robbery § 58 (1985).
109. 119 Mass. 354 (1876).
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fire in a shed close to Gleason's building.110 The government pro-
ceeded at trial only on the count involving Gleason's building."'
Defendant kept goods in Gleason's building and had insured those
goods for more than their value. The government's theory was that
defendant set the fire in order to collect the insurance money. Alleg-
edly to prove that the Gleason fire was intentionally set, the prosecu-
tion offered evidence concerning the two shed fires."1
2
Before trial, defendant conceded that the charged fire had been
set intentionally, but claimed that he was not the one responsible.
Thus, defendant objected to the evidence concerning the shed fires,
presumably on relevance grounds. The trial court admitted the evi-
dence nonetheless, and the appellate court affirmed. The court did
not explain either why defendant's pretrial admission did not pre-
clude evidence proving intent or why the evidence in question tended
to prove that fact. It merely stated that the government's theory was
that defendant acted on a motive to burn the building to collect the
insurance money."13
Assuming the government was properly entitled to prove intent
even though defendant conceded that point, the evidence would have
been relevant for that purpose if the evidence established that defen-
dant had in fact insured the goods for more than their value, and if
defendant had in fact intentionally burned the sheds. Under these
circumstances, it would be reasonable for the jury to conclude that
defendant had a motive to bum Gleason's building, and that if defen-
dant did in fact set the fire, he did not do so accidentally. Of course,
the evidence was also admissible to prove that defendant was the one
who burned the building. Though courts frequently admit uncharged
misconduct in situations similar to that in McCarthy, others have
110. Seeid. at354-55.
111. See id. at 354.
112. See id.at 355.
113. See id.; see also Regina v. Gray, 176 Eng. Rep. 924, 924-25 (K.B.
1866) (in prosecution for arson, fire occurred several months after defendant
obtained buildings and took out substantial fire insurance policies on them;
evidence of previous fires in buildings defendant occupied and insured was
admissible, most likely to prove identity of perpetrator).
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excluded the evidence where it is not needed, where the risk of unfair
prejudice is too great, and for other similar reasons."14
Recall that in United States v. Cunningham,"5 the prosecution
alleged that defendant's prior addiction to Demerol and activities re-
lated to it could be used to establish a continuing addiction to the
drug, and that her addiction, in turn, supplied a motive to steal it
from the hospital cabinet. If Cunningham fits any of the motive-to-
identity fact patterns, it is most likely the one just discussed. Though
the cases typically involve a motive to obtain money for a needed
item such as drugs, an analogy can be drawn between these cases and
Cunningham. Whether these cases and the variation represented by
Cunningham constitute a valid noncharacter theory for admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence will be considered at length later in
this Article.116 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that
courts commonly admit such evidence on this basis.
4. Evidence of misconduct subsequent to charged offense
suggesting reason to commit charged offense
Another recurring motive-to-identity fact pattern involves de-
fendant's conduct after the charged crime. That conduct, in turn,
helps to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. In some
of the cases, the reasoning is similar to that discussed to this point:
defendant, as shown by the uncharged misconduct evidence, had a
114. See, e.g., United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 323, 328-29 (6th Cir.
1997) (in prosecution for conspiracy to commit arson [allegedly committed] to
recover insurance proceeds, trial court admitted evidence that one defendant
had told employees that she wanted to have her house burned down and that
she would pay them $5000 to do so; court erred in admitting evidence because
other evidence of motive was available and risk of prejudice great; the court
held that the error was harmless under the circumstances, however); see also
People v. Fitzgerald, 50 N.E. 846, 846-51 (N.Y. 1898) (in arson prosecution of
pastor for burning parochial schoolhouse to recover insurance proceeds from
which his salary could be paid, trial court should not have admitted evidence of
other misconduct including additional fires to which defendant may have been
connected; evidence was too speculative, risk of distraction of jury was too
great, and defendant would not be prepared to answer for all alleged vrong-
doing in his life).
115. 103 F.3d 553, 555-57 (7th Cir. 1996). For discussion of Cunningham's
facts, see supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
116. See ihJra notes 311-313 and accompanying text.
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motive to commit the charged offense. Thus, it is more likely than it
would be without the evidence that defendant did in fact commit the
charged offense.
In State v. Brown," 7 for example, defendant was charged with
the murder of a deputy sheriff who had stopped defendant's car for
speeding."' Defendant claimed that another person shot the offi-
cer. 119 At trial, the court permitted the prosecution to offer evidence
that defendant had stolen the car. This evidence was relevant be-
cause it established a motive to shoot the officer. Specifically, it
provided a reason why defendant might have been the actor: to
avoid discovery of the auto theft.120 As the court stated, "[p]roof that
defendant had stolen the vehicle establishes a motive for defendant to
fire upon the officer in order to avoid being arrested on the speeding
charge."'
12 1
In Pugliese v. Commonwealth,122 defendant was charged with
robbery and murder. 123 At trial, a prosecution witness testified that
after the crime was committed, defendant purchased cocaine from
her. 124 The court held this evidence admissible to show that defen-
dant spent money obtained from the victim on drugs. This suggested
a motive for committing the crime, and thus that defendant was in-
volved. 125 The only essential difference between this case and those
discussed previously is that the motive for the charged crime was
supplied by evidence of events taking place after, rather than before,
that crime.
117. 398 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1981). The case is discussed in Golden, supra
note 1, at 207-08.
118. See id. at 1382-83.
119. See id. at 1384.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. 428 S.E.2d 16 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
123. See id. at 20.
124. See id. at 23.
125. See id. at 23-24.
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5. Evidence of uncharged misconduct suggesting motive to
prevent discovery of witnesses to the charged crime
or to silence those witnesses
One of the most common situations in which uncharged mis-
conduct is admissible to prove identity on a motive-type theory in-
volves conduct committed to prevent disclosure of a charged crime
or to silence witnesses to that crime.'
26
Sometimes, the uncharged conduct takes place before the
charged conduct. Once again, application of this theory has a long
history. For example, in People v. Stout, 27 defendant was accused
of murdering his brother-in-law. 28 The prosecution's theory was
that defendant committed the murder to prevent the victim from re-
vealing defendant's incestuous relationship with the victim's wife,
defendant's sister.129 To prove the motive, the prosecution offered
evidence of that relationship. 130  On appeal, the court affirmed,
holding:
[The evidence] went strongly to establish a motive on the
part of both of them to get the deceased out of the way.
While he lived, they were at his mercy. He was more inter-
ested than any one else to prosecute them for the crime ....
The corpus delicti had been proved, and the principal
question for the jury to determine, was, whether the pris-
oner was the perpetrator of, or implicated in, the crime.
The evidence on that question, though circumstantial, was
strong and convincing that he was the murderer. If any-
thing was wanting, it was a motive on his part. That motive
was supplied, in connection with other fhcts proved, by the
evidence .... 131
126. The hypothetical theft-murder case that has been used throughout this
Article is an example of this fact pattern. For the basic facts of the hypotheti-
cal, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text
127. 4 Park. Crim. 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858).
128. See id. at 112-14.
129. See id. at 113-14.
130. See id. at 114.
131. Id. at 115 (Welles, J., alternative holding). Note that the case obviously
involved a related motive: to eliminate the sister's husband to increase the op-
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
Another case also illustrates this route to admissibility. In
Moore v. United States,3 2 defendant was charged with the murder of
Palmer. 133 At trial, the prosecution offered evidence that defendant
suspected that Palmer was investigating the death of another man
(Camp) and defendant's possible connection with it. The evidence
tended to prove a motive for Palmer's murder, and was admissible
for that purpose. 34 The reasoning is as follows:
EVIDENCE: Defendant murdered Camp135 and knew that
Palmer suspected his involvement.
portunities for continuation of the incestuous relationship. On rehearing, the
court wrote:
The object of this evidence manifestly was, to prove a motive in the
mind of the defendant below to take the life of the deceased .... The
motive... was, to remove the deceased out of the way, to relieve Mrs.
Littles from her difficulties with him, and to afford more full and free
and safe opportunity to him for vicious intercourse with her.
Stout, 4 Park. Crim. 132, 138 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858); see also State v. Watkins,
9 Conn. 46, 47 (1831) (in trial for murdering his wife, evidence of defendant's
adulterous relationship with another woman was admissible); State v. Kent, 67
N.W. 1052, 1053, 1061 (N.D. 1896) (in prosecution of defendant for murder of
his wife by procuring another person to kill her, to prove defendant's involve-
ment, prosecution offered evidence of other criminal conduct occurring before
the murder, on the theory that these crimes were relevant to prove defendant
was motivated to kill his wife from fear that she would learn of these crimes
and would expose him; other evidence tended to show that defendant was
afraid his wife would learn of the crimes and that, in fact, his wife was suspi-
cious of him).
132. 150 U.S. 57 (1893).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 61. The Court admitted the evidence even though there was
other evidence that defendant had a different motive to kill Palmer. See id.;
see also Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 243-44 (1840) (in murder prosecution, to
prove defendant's motive to kill victim, evidence was admissible that defen-
dant had killed another person and that current victim had been investigating
the earlier crime; though court held evidence admissible because connected
with current crime, motive theory is more apt).
135. Note that for this theory to be valid, it is not absolutely necessary that
defendant have murdered Camp. If, for example, defendant feared that Palmer
might wrongfully accuse him of the Camp murder, defendant might have had a
motive to kill Palmer to prevent the wrongful accusation. The Court, however,
appears to have assumed for purposes of resolving the evidentiary issue that
defendant did kill Camp. See Moore, 150 U.S. at 61.
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->INFERENCE: Defendant had a motive to kill Palmer to
prevent Palmer from completing his investigation and dis-
closing his suspicions.
-->CONCLUSION: Defendant killed Palmer.
Modem cases continue to recognize this type of motive-to-
identity theory. In United States v. Talley,136 defendant, a law en-
forcement officer, was charged with soliciting the murders of an FBI
agent and a witness informant. 37 The informant was assisting the
FBI agent's investigation of defendant's possible criminal con-
duct.138 To prove defendant's motive to silence these individuals, the
government offered evidence of conversations revealing defendant's
numerous illegal activities. 39 On appeal, the court held that this evi-
dence was properly admitted
to illustrate Talley's motive for wanting [the individuals]
killed. As the government noted, it was required to show
why a deputy sheriff, held in such high repute, would seek
to have an FBI agent and witness killed. Thus, the state-
ments demonstrated the severity of the charges against
Talley and explained why he would want those witnesses
eliminated.
140
In other cases, the uncharged misconduct offered to prove mo-
tive occurs after the charged act. In these cases, the individual is
identified through a motive supplied by the charged conduct itself.
136. 164 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 1999).
137. See id. at 993.
138. See id. at 993-94.
139. See id. at 998.
140. Id. at 999-1000; see also State v. Simborski, 182 A. 221, 225 (Conn.
1936) (in prosecution for murder of police officer, evidence that officer ,as
investigating defendant for committing robberies was admissible to prove mo-
five); State v. Green, 652 P.2d 697, 701 (Kan. 1982) (in prosecution for murder
of wife where defendant claimed intruder committed crime, evidence that de-
fendant had previously assaulted wife admissible to prove motive to kill, and
thus that defendant was responsible); State v. Pancoast, 67 N.W. 1052 (N.D.
1896) (in prosecution for murder of wife, evidence of other offenses admissi-
ble to show that defendant procured murder of wife to prevent her from ex-
posing him).
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That motive leads to commission of other misconduct, which in turn
identifies the actor as the perpetrator of the charged offense. Though
the logic is a bit complex, the idea is both simple and compelling, as
the following example demonstrates: Suppose D is charged with the
murder of V1. At trial, the prosecution wishes to introduce evidence
that after the murder, D killed V2, an accomplice in the V1 killing. If
offered to prove D's identity, the inferential sequence is as follows:
EVIDENCE: D murdered V2, an alleged accomplice in the
murder of V1.
---INFERENCE: D had a motive to kill V2 to prevent V2
from disclosing D's participation in the V1 murder.
->CONCLUSION D killed Vi.
Thus, D's participation in the murder of V1 supplies the motive to
kill V2 to prevent V2's potential disclosure of the original crime.
141
The theory is an old one: "From the days of Moses to the present
time it has been the law that a person who fabricates, suppresses, or
destroys evidence must take the consequences of the honest indigna-
tion which his conduct naturally excites. Moses declared, '[c]ursed
be he that removeth his neighbor's landmark.' ' 142  The reasoning
supporting admissibility in these cases has sometimes been referred
to as behavior evidencing a consciousness of guilt.1 43 When the evi-
dence suggesting consciousness of guilt consists of uncharged
141. See, e.g., People v. Spaulding, 141 N.E. 196, 202 (Ill. 1923) (in prose-
cution for murder of a police officer, evidence that defendant murdered an al-
leged accomplice who had spoken to the police after the crime was admissible
to prove defendant's participation in the crime).
142. Id. (quoting Deuteronomy 27:17).
143. See, e.g., id. ("Modem decisions establish the rule that all efforts by ei-
ther party to a suit ... to destroy, fabricate or suppress evidence may be shown
as a circumstance indicating that the party's cause is an unrighteous one.");
State v. Shaw, 648 P.2d 287, 290 (Mont. 1982) ("Presenting evidence of an
attempted intimidation of a witness... pertains to the crime charged by indi-
cating consciousness of guilt.").
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misconduct, the problems associated with exposing the jury to un-
charged misconduct evidence come into play.
The logic of this route to admissibility requires that the individ-
ual actually have committed the uncharged misconduct. Sometimes,
that fact will be conceded or evidence of it will be overwhelming.
Where that is true, the reasoning is particularly compelling. Al-
though there is still a meaningful risk that the jury will misuse the
uncharged misconduct evidence (by, for example, convicting defen-
dant for the uncharged crime), the probative value of the evidence for
its legitimate purpose is sufficiently great to warrant admission.
In actual practice, however, it is considerably more likely that
the charged person will deny involvement in the uncharged crime.1'"
This means that for the evidence to be relevant, the jury must first
determine that defendant in fact did commit the uncharged crime. In
such a case, admissibility is at least somewhat more difficult to jus-
tify because the risk of unfair prejudice, as well as of distracting the
jury with peripheral matters, is considerably greater. Nevertheless,
courts tend to admit the evidence fairly routinely on the theory that,
if the jury finds that the defendant committed the uncharged act, the
probative value of that evidence on the issue of defendant's involve-
ment in the charged crime is sufficiently great. By the same token, it
is assumed that if the jury finds that defendant did not commit the
uncharged act, the jury will ignore evidence of that act.1
45
The case reporters are filled with decisions approving the admis-
sion of uncharged misconduct evidence that suggests a motive to
cover up another crime, such as by silencing witnesses, seeking to
144. This was the fact in Spaulding, where defendant claimed he vas not in-
volved in the murder of his alleged accomplice. The evidence of his guilt of
the killing of the accomplice, however, was overwhelming. See Spaulding,
141 N.E. at 202-03.
145. This general reasoning is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's de-
cision in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689-90 (1988), in which
the Court held that when there is a dispute as to the person's commission of the
uncharged misconduct, the standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) ap-
plies. According to that standard, the trial court should admit the questioned
evidence if the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to support the jury's
determination that the key fact (here, the person's commission of the un-
charged misconduct) is true.
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prevent the discovery of evidence suggesting guilt of the charged
crime, or otherwise engaging in criminal conduct evidencing a con-
sciousness of guilt. 14 6 Though many cases do not use the label "mo-
tive" to describe the theory of admissibility, it is clear that the cases
are applying the type of motive theory under consideration here. In
addition, of course, the rule permitting the use of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence to prove a fact at issue is not limited to the specific list
provided in the common forms of the rule.
14 7
Some cases involve uncharged misconduct occurring both be-
fore and after the charged event. In Gibbs v. State,148 defendant was
charged with the murder of a woman. The prosecution offered evi-
dence of two other killings: of the woman's husband shortly before
the charged crime; and of the couple's daughter shortly after the
charged crime. The prosecution's theory was that the killing of the
husband provided the motive for the charged killing (to conceal his
identity as the killer of the wife), and that defendant killed the
daughter for much the same reason--to prevent her from revealing
his guilt. 149 Although the appellate court ultimately rested its deci-
sion approving of admission of the evidence on a somewhat different
theory, to be discussed immediately below, it is clear that the prose-
cution's motive theory is valid.
146. See, e.g., Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 245 (1840) (in prosecution for
murder of detective, proof that detective was investigating an attempted assas-
sination committed by defendant admissible to prove motive); People v. Gam-
bino, 145 N.E.2d 42, 44 (Ill. 1957) (while awaiting trial for charged offense,
defendant escaped and attempted escape from confinement); Shaw, 648 P.2d at
289 (in prosecution for theft, evidence that defendant had threatened one of
prosecution's key witnesses admissible to prove consciousness of guilt); Peo-
ple v. Harris, 33 N.E. 65, 72-73 (N.Y. 1893) (in prosecution of man for murder
of his wife, evidence that defendant had, among other things, kept the marriage
a secret, produced an abortion on his wife, and had affairs with other women
was admissible to prove motive for murder); Blackwell v. State, 15 S.W. 597,
599 (Tex. Ct. App. 1890) (in prosecution for murder, evidence that defendant
had committed theft and arson was admissible to prove defendant killed the
victim to aid in his escape).
147. See Shaw, 648 P.2d at 289 ("The statutory list of purposes for which
other crime evidence may be admitted is not inclusive.").
148. 300 S.W.2d 890 (Tenn. 1957).
149. See id. at 892.
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In some cases involving the admission of uncharged misconduct
to cover up other criminal conduct, courts admit the evidence on a
related theory. Instead of stating that the evidence is admissible to
show motive, these courts hold that the charged and uncharged
crimes are part of the same act, even though only one of the crimes is
the subject of the prosecution. So, for example, in the Gibbs case,
the court held that the "real reason" for admitting the evidence of the
other killings was "that they were inseparable components of a com-
pleted crime."'150 The court recognized that the crimes were not ac-
tually the same;' 5' each was a separate crime, though all were re-
lated. And the court criticized the use of the term "res gestae" to
describe this theory, i1 2 as did Wigmore, who also preferred language
such as "same transaction."'1
53
Rather than employ the fiction that the crimes were all part of
the same transaction, it would be better to analyze these cases under
the theory of motive or uncharged misconduct to show consciousness
of guilt, and from that fact, identity. Those labels more clearly de-
scribe the reasoning being employed.
6. Evidence of prior assaults on victim suggesting motive to
commit charged crime
In prosecutions for assault, murder, and similar crimes, some
courts have admitted evidence of prior violent behavior by the
charged person against the same victim on a motive-to-identity
150. Id.
151. The court wrote that defendant killed the woman "to cover up a crime
that had already been committed" (the murder of the husband), and that the de-
fendant killed the daughter "to cover up this second crime." Id. at 892-93.
Thus, the court recognized that the crimes were, in fact, distinct.
152. See id. at 892 (rejecting the term as "useless and confusing").
153. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 218. Wigmore argued:
The term "res gestae" should be once and for all abandoned as
useless and confusing. Let it be said that such acts receivable as "nec-
essary parts of the proof of an entire deed", or "inseparable parts of the
deed", or "concomitant parts of the criminal act", or anything else that
carries its own reasoning and definition with it; but let legal discussion
sedulously avoid this much-abused and wholly unmanageable Latin
phrase.
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theory. As one text explains: "If the defendant has previously as-
saulted the same person, then these courts allow the prior assault to
be used as evidence that the defendant disliked the person, providing
a motive for a subsequent assault. Such evidence could be admissi-
ble to prove that defendant committed the crime ....
The facts of State v. Green'55 illustrate the theory. Defendant
was charged with murdering his wife, from whom he was separated.
The murder weapon appeared to be an axe. Defendant denied com-
mitting the crime, claiming that the murder was committed by an in-
truder. To prove defendant's involvement, the prosecution offered
evidence that a year before the murder, defendant had thrown a small
hatchet at his wife,' 56 and that in the weeks prior to the murder, there
had been marital discord, with defendant at one point threatening to
send his wife "'back to Africa in a pine box."",157 Defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder. On appeal, the court approved ad-
mission of the evidence:
Obviously, the identity of the assailant was a critical issue
in the case .... [U]nder these circumstances evidence of
the defendant's prior assaults against his wife was of great
probative value on the issue of identity .... [W]e conclude
that evidence of a discordant marital relationship, including
the defendant's prior acts of violence against his wife and
threats to kill her, is admissible ... where the evidence is
offered not for the purpose of proving distinct offenses, but
rather to establish the relationship of the parties, the exis-
tence of a continuing course of conduct between the parties,
or to corroborate the testimony of the witnesses as to the act
charged. '58
154. ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW § 5.18 (1998). Often the same
evidence will be relevant to the criminal intent or motive of the actor. See id.
155. 652 P.2d 697 (Kan. 1982).
156. See id. at 700 (defendant was convicted of battery arising from the ear-
lier incident).
157. Id. at 699 (quoting trial testimony).
158. Id. at 701; see also Melton v. State, 43 Ark. 367, 371-72 (1884) (hold-
ing that in prosecution of Ku Klux Klan member for murder, evidence of pre-
vious assault on victim was admissible to "show a series of connected wrongs,
growing out of and illustrating one another and culminating in homicide," and
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To generalize, then, the reasoning of the courts in these eases is
as follows:
EVIDENCE: Prior to the crime charged, D had committed vio-
lent acts against V.
->INFERENCE: D harbored ill-will toward V.
->INFERENCE: D had a motive to commit the charged
violent crime against .
->CONCLUSION: D committed the charged crime.
The reasoning is valid and does not violate the character evidence
prohibition. At the same time, as with other motive evidence, it does
not avoid all propensity inferences; moving from one inference to
another requires one to conclude that a person with a motive is more
likely than one without a motive to act in a particular way.' 59
7. Miscellaneous uses of motive evidence to prove identity
Courts have approved the admission of uncharged misconduct
evidence that shows motive, and from that fact, the identity of the
actor, in numerous other situations. A few examples will illustrate.
In United States v. Pierce,60 defendant Tackett was charged, inter
alia, with arson arising from the burning of a church. The govern-
ment alleged that Tackett committed the act at the request of Pierce,
a co-conspirator, and theorized that Tackett was financially depend-
ent on Pierce and had set fire to the church in part to stay in Pierce's
good graces. 161 To prove the close relationship between Tackett and
Pierce, the government offered evidence that for years, Tackett had
stolen property and delivered it to Pierce in exchange for money.
that "evidence of the previous offense is competent where it discloses a motive
for the act which is the subject of investigation").
159. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
160. 62 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1995).
161. The evidence indicated that Pierce was Imperial Wizard of the local
chapter of the Ku Klux Klan and that he wanted to bum the church because its
pastor had been a vocal critic of the Klan. See id. at 822.
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Approving admission of the evidence, the court stated:
At trial, the government developed a theory that presented
Tackett as financially dependent upon Pierce. Pierce alleg-
edly wanted the Church burned down. The only way for
the government to prove Tackett's motive and Pierce's in-
tent was to establish their relationship ....
Rule 404(b) does not prevent the government from estab-
lishing how members of a conspiracy are related, solely be-
cause doing so would include evidence of prior criminal
activities. 162
A somewhat similar theory was apparently used by a Colorado
court in People v. Nicholas.13 Defendant appealed his conviction of
first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.
The prosecution's theory was that defendant and an accomplice
planned a robbery, and that the actual robbery and subsequent
shooting were committed by the accomplice while the defendant
waited across the street. At trial, the prosecution was permitted to
offer evidence of defendant's alleged gang affiliation. The purpose
of the evidence was to prove that the accomplice performed the
crimes to show that he should be allowed to join defendant's gang.
Thus, defendant's gang affiliation was admissible to prove the mo-
tive of his alleged accomplice, and from that, defendant's involve-
ment in the crimes.' 64 Though the evidence in Nicholas tended to
show the motive of a person other than the defendant, that motive,
under the circumstances, implicated defendant in the crimes.
8. A brief perspective: the motive-to-identity theory
In each of the fact patterns discussed in this section, the motive-
to-identity theory appears to be a legitimate application of the princi-
ple that uncharged misconduct evidence may be used to prove a rele-
vant fact if it does not require a character-based propensity inference.
The second leap in the inferential chain-from the existence of a
162. Id. at 829; see also United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390, 393 (6th Cir.
1986) (allowing evidence of prior criminal activities to "set up the scene" and
establish relationship between co-conspirators).
163. 950 P.2d 634 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
164. See id. at 636-37.
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motive to the commission of the charged act-always involves a type
of propensity inference, but because the validity of that inference
does not depend on an assumption about the person's character, the
law does not forbid it. Although a legitimate, noncharacter theory
does not guarantee admissibility where the court may still exclude
the evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, the cases applying the theory pass the ini-
tial test for admissibility.
In Cunningham,16 5 the court approved the trial court's admission
of evidence of the nurse's uncharged misconduct to establish her
identity as the person who stole the Demerol from the locked cabinet.
Later, I will turn to whether the Cunningham court stated a legitimate
theory for the noncharacter use of the nurse's other misconduct.1
66
First, it is useful to complete the story of motive by examining the
other two ultimate purposes for which motive evidence may be rele-
vant.
B. The Use ofMotive to Prove Actus Reus
In the typical criminal prosecution, there is ample evidence that
the underlying criminal act occurred. In a prosecution for murder or
theft, for example, the act's occurrence usually will not be in contro-
versy. But sometimes there is a legitimate dispute about the occur-
rence of the act. Perhaps the alleged murder victim's body was
never found, leaving doubt as to whether any killing took place. Or
perhaps the condition of the body did not attest to the cause of death,
whether natural, self-inflicted, or by the act of another. Moreover,
there are some types of cases in which the lack of physical evidence
or disinterested witnesses makes the commission of the criminal act a
matter of dispute. This is obviously the case with charges of incest
or other types of sexual crimes, though it can be true of other crimes
as well.
In any case in which the commission of the criminal act by any
party is disputed, evidence that the person charged with the act had a
165. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text for a description of the
facts.
166. See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW
motive to commit it can, in theory, be admissible to prove that the act
occurred. Writing in 1978, Wright and Graham recognized this pos-
sibility, though they wrote that the federal courts had not embraced
it. 167 With the passage of a few years, however, the same commen-
tators were able to state that the courts' reluctance was no longer
evident, and they cited numerous cases in which the courts applied
the theory.
6
In fact, for some time, courts have approved admission of un-
charged misconduct evidence to establish the occurrence of an event
by means of motive in at least one type of case: prosecutions for
sexual crimes including rape and child molestation. Although recent
developments in evidence law have rendered such evidence more
broadly admissible in many jurisdictions, 69 courts have long ap-
proved admission of such evidence in sex crime cases for at least
three reasons, all of which tend toward the same conclusion-that
proof of the crime's occurrence is exceedingly difficult to muster.
First, these crimes generally take place in private, meaning that the
only witnesses are likely to be the defendant and the alleged victim,
who will, of course, offer diametrically opposed stories. Second,
these crimes can often be committed without leaving significant
physical traces, making circumstantial proof difficult. Third, even if
physical evidence did exist at one time, it often has been destroyed
by the time the crime is reported and investigated. At base, then,
courts have admitted the uncharged misconduct evidence in these
cases because it is needed. 170
As a result of these often insurmountable obstacles to successful
prosecution, courts have permitted prosecutors to offer evidence of
other acts between the defendant and the victim. The theory is
167. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 21, at 484.
168. See 22 id. at n.78 (Supp. 1999).
169. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413-415 (allowing for broad admissibility of
evidence of prior sexual assault and child molestation in criminal prosecutions
and civil actions for such conduct); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West Supp.
2000) (applying similarly broad admissibility standards in criminal prosecu-
tions).
170. Recall that need is one of the criteria a court should use in determining
the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. See supra notes 75-79
and accompanying text.
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exemplified by People v. Leonard,171 a Colorado case. Defendant
was convicted of aggravated incest. The alleged victim was his step-
daughter, who had been thirteen years old at the time the act alleg-
edly occurred. At trial, the stepdaughter, now an adult, testified
about the incident. Defendant denied that the act occurred, claiming
that the stepdaughter had fabricated the story.
172
To prove that the stepdaughter's story was not fabricated--that
the incestuous conduct did in fact occur--4he stepdaughter was per-
mitted to testify, over defendant's objection, about seven other inci-
dents of improper sexual contact defendant had with her from the
time she was three years old.173 On appeal of his conviction, the
court held the evidence properly admissible to prove that the charged
act occurred by means of motive. The court recognized that although
this was not the usual way in which motive evidence is used, it was
in fact relevant for this purpose:
We recognize that evidence of uncharged conduct indica-
tive of motive is generally admitted for the purpose of es-
tablishing identity or intent .... However, admission of
such evidence... has been approved in sexual assault cases
on a number of occasions as bearing on defendant's motive
even though identity and intent were not at issue ....
Thus, while sexual gratification may be a motive in any
sexual assault [case], .. . the concept of motive involves
more.
In our view, the concept of motive in a sexual assault case
may also address other relevant factors such as why a par-
ticular type of behavior is involved or why a particular vic-
tim is selected for the assault. Thus, evidence of motive as
reflected in the occurrence of prior uncharged conduct may
171. 872 P.2d 1325 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
172. See id.
173. The prior incidents differed somewhat from the charged crime, but the
court held that they were sufficiently similar in that they involved the same
parties, occurred in private, and included express or implied intimidation. All
were characteristics of the charged crime. Though the type of activity changed
as the victim grew older, the court did not find this to be significant See id. at
1327.
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tend to establish the charged offense.' 74
Summarizing, the court held that "evidence of the defendant's prior
acts of assault against the victim without consequence was relevant
to demonstrate that it was more probable than not that defendant had
a motive to commit yet another assault and thus to demonstrate that
the victim's testimony was not fabricated.'
175
The theory of admissibility in cases such as People v. Leonard
appears to take the following form:
EVIDENCE: Defendant had engaged in a number of improper
sexual contacts with the alleged victim.
-)INFERENCE: Defendant had a motive to continue en-
gaging in similar conduct with that person.
-CONCLUSION. The alleged crime took place. (Or, the
alleged victim did not fabricate her testimony.)
The reasoning has been embraced by many courts, whether under the
label of "motive" or one of a number of other designations.
76
Though it has been employed to permit evidence of uncharged sexual
misconduct with persons other than the victim,177 most courts limit
174. See id. at 1328.
175. Id.; see also State v. O'Donnell, 61 P. 892, 893 (Or. 1900) ("When a
prisoner is charged with any form of illicit sexual intercourse, evidence of the
commission of similar crimes by the same parties is admissible to prove an in-
clination to commit the act for which the accused is put upon his trial."); State
v. Start, 132 P. 512, 515 (Or. 1913) (enumerating exceptions stated in
O'Donnell, including limitation to sexual activity between same parties);
Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 435 (Wyo. 1991) (in prosecution for sexual
abuse of stepdaughters, evidence of numerous uncharged incidents of sexual
misconduct involving same victims was admissible to show course of conduct
or pattern between defendants and victims and motive, both of which tended to
prove that the charged acts occurred; "[t]he demonstration of the long-term
pattern of sexual abuse constituted an attempt by the State to rebut this claim
that the case against [defendant] was fabricated").
176. For a discussion of cases, see R.P. Davis, Annotation, Admissibility, in
Prosecution for Sexual Offense, of Evidence of Other Similar Offenses, 77
A.L.R.2D 841, § 27 (1961 & Supp. 1998).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Gano, 560 F.2d 990, 992-93 (10th Cir. 1977)
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the evidence to other instances of sexual conduct between defendant
and the same victim. 78 Sometimes, courts state a number of pur-
poses for which the evidence is admissible. 1
79
The rationales offered by the courts in these cases are not always
persuasive. For example, in People v. Banev,s8 defendant was
charged with incest with his daughter and with committing lewd acts
upon his granddaughter, both minors. At trial, the prosecution was
permitted to offer evidence of numerous uncharged criminal sexual
acts defendant committed on the same children. On appeal, the court
held that the evidence admissible to prove that the charged acts oc-
curred, and that it did not violate the character evidence rule.18 1 Spe-
cifically, the court held the evidence admissible under the "modus
operand" theory to prove the charged acts occurred by supporting
(holding that in prosecution for sexual contact with a female under sixteen,
evidence that defendant had sexual intercourse with victim's mother was ad-
missible); Adrian v. People, 770 P.2d 1243, 1244-46 (Colo. 1989) (holding
that in prosecution for sexual assault, evidence of prior sexual assaults on an-
other child was admissible).
178. See, e.g., Dockerty v. People, 219 P. 220, 220-21 (Colo. 1923) (in
prosecution for assault and taking indecent liberties on minor daughter, evi-
dence of sexual intercourse with older daughter should not have been admit-
ted); State v. Marvin, 197 N.W. 315, 315-16 (Iowa 1924) (in prosecution for
lewd, immoral, and lascivious acts with a minor girl, evidence of other similar
acts at a different time and with a different girl should not have been presented;
trial judge's withdrawal of the evidence and instruction to jury to ignore it did
not cure error in admission); Start, 132 P. at 515 (stating that rule permitting
evidence of other sexual offenses is limited to conduct between same parties);
McAllister v. State, 88 N.W. 212, 212-13 (Wis. 1901) (where defendant was
charged with assault with intent to rape, trial court erred in allowing evidence
of defendant's attempt to rape another person, even though that attempt oc-
curred within about an hour of and in close proximity to the charged crime); cf
Dunscombe v. State, 197 P. 1073, 1077 (Okla. Crim. App. 1921) (in prosecu-
tion for assault with intent to rape, evidence of defendants' sexual misconduct
with other persons is sometimes admissible but should have been excluded in
this case because conduct was too dissimilar and too remote in time).
179. See, e.g., Gano, 560 F.2d at 993 (evidence was admissible to prove
"motive, preparation, plan and knowledge (or state of mind)"; court found no
error in admission of the evidence even though defendant based defense on in-
sanity rather than on claim that charged act did not occur); Adrian, 770 P.2d at
1246 (evidence admissible to prove "modus operandi and motive," presumably
relevant to prove charged acts occurred).
180. 143 Cal. App. 3d490, 192 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1983).
181. See id. at 494, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
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the credibility of the victim-witnesses. 82 While recognizing that
modus operandi reasoning is usually applied to establish the identity
of the perpetrator, the court held that the theory "may also support
the credibility of a witness in a sex crime case.., by corroborating
the details peculiar to the offenses."'
' 83
The facts of Barney might support application of the modus op-
erandi reasoning, particularly if identity of the perpetrator were at is-
sue.'8 4 However, its use to support the credibility of the witnesses,
and thus also show that the charged acts occurred, is at least some-
what suspect. The court's reasoning appears to be as follows:
EVIDENCE: Defendant committed a number of improper sex-
ual contacts that shared many common characteristics with the
charged conduct.
-->INFERENCE: The testimony of the alleged victims con-
cerning the charged conduct was corroborated.
-- INFERENCE: The alleged victims' testimony is credi-
ble.
-)CONCLUSION: The charged conduct took place.
The court's theory, then, is that corroboration of the alleged victims'
testimony by other similar incidents makes that testimony credible.
Arguably, this theory does not avoid the forbidden character infer-
ence. Corroboration would be a valid theory when identity is in is-
sue (in which case the similarity of the charged and uncharged con-
duct would support the modus operandi reasoning). But when the
only issue is whether the charged conduct took place, the reasoning
appears to violate the character rule. Reasoning from the common
characteristics to the commission of the crime requires an inference
182. See id. at 495, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 496, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 176 (pointing to numerous factual
similarities among the charged and uncharged occurrences, some of which
were quite distinctive).
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that defendant would continue to commit such crimes, inferences
driven not by the similarity of the acts, but by defendant's propensity
toward this kind of criminal behavior. 85 In any event, the case is
part of a tangled history in recent California authority concerning the
admissibility of uncharged misconduct in sex crime cases, and its
validity is uncertain. 186
Many other cases involving incest and similar behavior admit
uncharged misconduct evidence to prove that the charged act took
place without specifying the precise reasoning supporting admission.
In State v. Akers,18 7 for example, the court simply held:
While proof of other distinct crimes is not ordinarily admis-
sible, it is proper in a prosecution for incest to admit evi-
dence of [other sexual acts defendant committed on the al-
leged victim], "since such evidence is of such a character as
tends to make it probable that the parties did commit the
specific offense charged. They constitute the foundation
for an antecedent probability."'188
As indicated, the court did not specify the precise noncharacter rea-
soning that makes the uncharged misconduct admissible in such
cases to prove that the crime took place, 189 other than to imply that
185. See BERNARD S. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK §
33.6, at 1212-13 (2d ed. 1982) (criticizing broad rule rejecting admissibility of
uncharged misconduct evidence when used only to corroborate victim's testi-
mony). Jefferson would allow admission of such evidence to support victim
witness testimony when the evidence can be offered under some other theory,
such as intent. He argues that "logic and reason" would require that such evi-
dence be treated as propensity evidence regardless of its admissibility on some
other ground.
186. See People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1994) (overruling a number of
cases stating theories on which the Barney court relied).
187. 328 S.W.2d31 (Mo. 1959).
188. Id. at 33-34 (quoting State v. Pruitt, 100 S.W. 431,432 (Mo. 1907)).
189. See also Veloz v. State, 666 S.W.2d 581, 582-83 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that the general rule forbidding the use of uncharged misconduct to
prove that the defendant committed the crime "does not apply to sex offenses
committed against minors by their parents or others standing in the position of
a parent," and that in such cases, the evidence "is admitted in order to enable
the jury to properly evaluate the inherently questionable testimony of a minor
against an adult responsible for his welfare").
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the need for the evidence overrides concerns that otherwise would
lead to exclusion.
The language employed by some courts reveals more clearly
what arguably stands behind admission of the evidence in these
cases: a specific type of motive-based theory. In Barney, for exam-
ple, the court held that the evidence "tended to prove defendant had a
strong and continuing sexual desire for [the victim] likely to have
been realized on the occasion of the charged offense."' 90 In Happner
v. State,191 another incest prosecution, the court used similarly mo-
tive-laden language:
"In matters of incest or rape under the age of consent, it is
often of importance to show ... how one in a position de-
manding care and guidance of a related person, has failed in
such duty and has adopted an unnatural attitude relative
thereto, and by fondling or otherwise, evidences a desire for
sexual gratification toward such child or relative.'
192
This motivationally driven language was at one time common in
American sex crime cases, and went under various labels including
"deviate sexual instinct" or "depraved sexual instinct," and "lustful
disposition."' 193 Though a complete discussion of the origins, scope,
and viability of that theory is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
190. Barney, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
191. 325 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959).
192. Id. at 391-92 (quoting Johns v. State, 236 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1951)); see also Laredo v. State, 232 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Tex. Crim. App.
1950) (holding evidence admissible "as showing this kind of act as probable by
reason of [defendant's] unnatural passion for this girl").
193. See McCORMICK, supra note 39, § 190, at 803-04 (describing cases
admitting uncharged misconduct evidence "[t]o show a passion or propensity
for unusual and abnormal sexual relations," and noting that some cases have
admitted such evidence even when it involves persons other than the alleged
victim). Some courts that previously had embraced this theory have now
abandoned it. See, e.g., Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1337-41 (Ind.
1992) (overruling "depraved sexual instinct exception" to rule barring evidence
of prior bad acts; court noted that one of the two main rationales for the rule
was the perceived need to support the credibility of an alleged victim of this
type of crime).
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sufficient for present purposes to note that it purports to rest, at least
in part, on a theory of motive.
194
Uncharged misconduct evidence has also been admitted in other
types of cases to prove that the alleged act occurred. In State i
Harshman,195 the court employed reasoning similar to that used in
some of the sex crimes cases. Defendant was convicted of drug
charges after he allegedly provided one hitchhiker with nine pills
containing methamphetamine. The hitchhiker testified for the prose-
cution that defendant gave him the pills as a "sample" of drugs he
had with him. Defendant claimed the story was fabricated-that he
never provided any drugs, and that the witnesses contrived the testi-
mony because they had a financial stake in the outcome of the case.
To prove defendant's guilt, the prosecution was permitted to present
evidence that a few days after the charged event, defendant sold one
of the same persons 800 pills containing methamphetamine. Al-
though the appellate court held that the trial court committed reversi-
ble error by failing to grant defendant a continuance after the prose-
cution revealed its intention to offer the evidence only on the
morning of the trial, 196 the court held that on retrial, the evidence
194. For a more complete analysis of the "depraved sexual instinct" theory,
see Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy
in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REv. 563, 581-83 (1997); David P. Byden &
Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L.
REv. 529, 557-60 (1994); Sarah B. Colley, New Mexico Rejects the "Lewd and
Lascivious" Exception to Rule 404(b): State v. Lucero, 24 N.M. L. REv. 427,
430-31 (1994); Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Un-
charged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CuM. L. 127,
135-40 (1993); David J. Kaloyanides, Comment, The Depraved Sexual Instinct
Theory: An Example of the Propensity for Aberrant Application of Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b), 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1297 (1992); L. Ren6e Lieux,
Note, The Michigan Pig Farm Perception: The Michigan Supreme Court Con-
tinues to Ignore the Opportunity to Create a Lustful Disposition Exception to
Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b), 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 127, 151-52
(1998); Ellen H. Meilaender, Note, Revisiting Indiana's Rule of Evidence
404(b) and the Lannan Decision in Light of Federal Rules of Evidence 413-
415, 75 IND. L.J. 1103, 1107-13 (2000); Lisa M. Segal, Note, The Admissibility
of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offense Cases: New Federal Rules
of Evidence Codify the Lusful Disposition Exception, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
515 (1995).
195. 658 P.2d 1173 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
196. See id. at 1176-77.
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would be admissible to prove motive because "[w]ithout evidence of
the later sale, the state is left with the unexplained gift of nine pills
by a hitchhiker to a paid drug informant.' 97 Thus, the reasoning ap-
pears similar to that used in some of the sex crimes cases: the evi-
dence is admissible to support the credibility of the prosecution wit-
nesses, whose testimony concerning the charged crime would not
appear plausible without the evidence. 198
In State v. Rader,199 defendant was charged with arson in the
alleged burning of two haystacks. The prosecution's theory was that
defendant did so in retaliation for the victim's reporting another
crime (that defendant had cut off the tail of one of the victim's cows)
to the police. At trial, the victim was permitted to testify concerning
this uncharged act. Although on appeal the court held that admission
20of the testimony was reversible error, the court also stated that it
would have been permissible for the state to elicit testimony "that a
charge of that character had been made... and that charge followed
by an arrest . ,,2o" Presumably, the evidence would have been
admissible to show a motive to retaliate, and from that motive, the
likelihood that defendant did indeed commit the crime of arson.202
197. Id. at 1177.
198. See id. at 1177 & n.4. Because the jury was exposed to other evidence
of defendant's drug-related activity, the prosecution argued that the evidence
would not have significant prejudicial impact. See id. Though this appears to
be true, it might also be true that because other evidence made the prosecution
witnesses' story appear plausible, evidence of defendant's later sale of a large
amount of illegal drugs was not necessary. Thus, the court reasonably could
have concluded that the probative value of the evidence was too slight to jus-
tify! admission.
199. 124 P. 195 (Or. 1912).
200. See id. at 196. It seems clear that under modern rules, the evidence of
the underlying act would have been admissible unless its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because the exis-
tence of a motive could be evidenced by the victim's charge concerning the
cow, rather than testimony that the act had in fact occurred, the legitimate pro-
bative value of affirmative testimony of the act itself would be slight. Never-
theless, the jury is likely to infer defendant's commission of the uncharged act
from the testimony of the victim's charge and defendant's arrest.
201. Id.
202. The court did not make clear whether the actual issue in the case was
whether any burning occurred or whether defendant was the perpetrator of a
burning that concededly occurred. The evidence would have been relevant to
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Sometimes, the bare facts of an alleged crime do not speak for
themselves, and in fact might be misunderstood by a fact finder un-
familiar with the broader factual context in which the events took
place. It is, of course, well established that in such cases, evidence
of other events is sometimes admissible simply to complete the
story--to fill out the factual record by placing the events in con-
text.203 In such cases, courts have sometimes approved the use of
uncharged misconduct evidence to provide the necessary factual
background to make the parties' behavior comprehensible. Some-
times, the uncharged misconduct evidence does so by demonstrating
a motive to act in a particular way, which in turn shows the nature of
the events at issue. In United States v. Williams,204 for example, de-
fendants were charged with kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap one
Harris. To prove that the actions of the defendants constituted a kid-
napping, the prosecution offered evidence that defendants were in
possession of drugs when they were apprehended, that they killed the
alleged kidnapping victim, and that the victim was a rival drug
dealer.20 5 The court admitted the evidence, and defendants' convic-
tions were affirmed on appeal.
20 6
The appellate court held that the evidence was admissible on
two grounds. First, the killing of Harris completed the story of the
crime itself--that it was an "integral part" of the kidnapping. Sec-
ond, the fact that the defendants were in possession of drugs and that
they were involved in drug trafficking provided a motive to get rid of
a rival drug dealer.20 7 The ultimate import of both of these rationales
either ultimate purpose.
203. This is an important reason behind the geneml principle that a party is
entitled to prove its case through any otherwise admissible evidence. See Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182, 186-91 (1997) (endorsing the idea
of "full evidentiary context," and the right to tell a story with "descriptive rich-
ness," and creating a narrow exception for situations in which the fact finder
would not be assisted in any way by hearing precise testimony on an issue be-
cause the opponent's offered stipulation gives the offering party everything the
questioned evidence would have provided).
204. 95 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1996).
205. See id. at 731. This evidence required an inference that defendants
were also drug dealers.
206. See id.
207. See id.
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is to demonstrate that the facts show a kidnapping rather than inno-
cent behavior. Without the evidence, it would have been considera-
bly more difficult for the jury to comprehend and evaluate the defen-
dants' behavior.20 8
As the above discussion shows, courts should not admit all un-
charged misconduct evidence purportedly offered to prove that an
event occurred. United States v. Vance209 illustrates the need for
close scrutiny of the precise claims and defenses in order to deter-
mine the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence on a mo-
tive theory.210 In Vance, defendant, a prominent Kentucky politician,
was charged with conspiracy to transport a weapon in interstate
commerce with knowledge that it was to be used to commit murder;
he was also charged with the underlying act itself. The murder vic-
tim was a Florida prosecutor, and the killer was Kelly, whose hus-
band the victim had successfully prosecuted for drug crimes. Kelly
was assisted by Taylor. Both Kelly and Taylor testified for the
prosecution in Vance's trial. The government charged that on the
day of the murder, Vance and the others set up an auto accident in
Kentucky to place the killer in that state and thus provide an alibi.
Vance denied involvement in the crime.
At trial, the government offered into evidence a number of prior
criminal acts committed by Vance, Kelly, and Kelly's husband. The
purpose of the evidence was to prove Vance's motive to assist
Kelly.21 ' The government claimed that this was necessary in order to
demonstrate to the jury why a prominent person would become in-
volved in such a crime. The trial court admitted much of this evi-
212dence, explaining, in part:
208. The Williams case arguably could be classified as one in which the evi-
dence shows intent through the mechanism of motive. That is, the evidence
shows the state of mind of the defendants in holding the victim.
209. 871 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1989).
210. See id. at 573-74.
211. See id. at 574.
212. See id. at 575. The court permitted the prosecution to offer evidence of
the following uncharged crimes: detonation of a bomb on the property of a
judge, theft of a machine gun from a police impoundment lot, illegal manu-
facture of gun silencer parts, and production of false identification papers.
Vance was involved in each of these acts, along with one or both of the Kellys.
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Much of the government's prior act evidence attempts to
show why the defendant would risk this high social and po-
litical prominence by becoming involved in a murder. Any
murder! The alleged criminal relationship between the un-
indicted co-conspirators and Vance is probative on the issue
of motivation in the transfer of the pistol.
21 3
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not abused its dis-
cretion in admitting this evidence.21 4 The court explained that the
crimes were admissible to prove motive on essentially the same
grounds stated by the trial court: "to show why this well-known citi-
zen of considerable public standing and prominence, and a former
law enforcement officer, could have been motivated to assist Bonnie
Kelly in the commission of Berry's murder."215
The court's reasoning that the evidence is admissible to show a
motive that would be difficult to understand in the absence of the
evidence is flawed for a number of reasons, perhaps best explained
by Wright and Graham:
The trial court admitted the evidence to show what moti-
vated the defendant to transfer the gun, hence it was admis-
sible under Rule 404(b) only if it proved the defendant did
so without requiring the jury to draw an inference to the de-
fendant's character. The rationale for admitting the evi-
dence was that because the defendant was politically
213. Id. (quoting trial court's memorandum opinion and order).
214. See id. at 576.
215. Id. The factual record of the case is unclear in one respect. There ap-
pears to have been no contest that defendant transported the weapon, but it is
not clear whether defendant claimed he did not give the weapon to Kelly or
that he gave the weapon to Kelly without knowing Kelly's intention to use it in
a murder. If Vance's claim was the former, the evidence would have been of-
fered to prove that he committed the criminal act of transferring the weapon. If
he admitted transferring the weapon but claimed he did not know how it would
be used, the ultimate purpose of the evidence would have been to prove
Vance's criminal intent. Wright and Graham assume the evidence was offered
to prove the criminal act See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 21, § 5240.
Perhaps the distinction is not terribly important, however. Even if Vance ad-
mitted committing the act, the prosecution still would have had to prove that he
did so knowing how the weapon was to be used. Ultimately, this is likely to
have been the primary issue in the case.
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well-connected,... the jury was unlikely to believe that he
would have provided a gun to be used to kill a prosecutor in
another state. This comes perilously close to saying that
because the jury is likely to think that the defendant is of
good character and unlikely to commit the crime, the prose-
cution is entitled to show the defendant's bad character by
showing all the evil he had participated in over the preced-
ing decade.
The difficulty with the court's rationale is that it does not
appear that the defendant put his character in issue, since by
doing so he would have opened the door to the use of these
other crimes on cross-examination of his character wit-
nesses. If this is correct, it is not clear how the jurors would
have been aware that the defendant was a "man of social
and political prominence" inasmuch as this would appear to
be irrelevant in the absence of a character defense. Hence,
one is left with the suspicion that either the defendant's
background came in as part of the prosecution's own case
or because of a prosecutorial failure to object when the de-
fense introduced evidence of the defendant's political con-
nections.
The most troubling aspect of the case is that in neither the
trial court nor in the appellate court does there appear to
have been any attempt to explain how the evidence of these
other crimes would have motivated the defendant to furnish
the murder weapon. That the defendant was a friend of the
killers could probably have been shown without proving
that they committed crimes together. It does not appear that
the killers used their knowledge of the defendant's crimes
to blackmail him into furnishing the weapon. The fact that
they had apparently kept secret his part in the prior crimes
might explain why defendant felt safe to participate in this
crime but it does not explain why he wanted to become in-
volved at all, except out of a general antisocial character.
Perhaps there are other noncharacter inferences that would
allow the evidence to be admitted without violating the
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letter and spirit of Rule 404(b), but these are not mentioned
in the opinion.
216
Wright and Graham are correct in asserting that defendant did
not appear to have opened the door to character evidence, and thus,
the reasoning of the court is suspect. Nevertheless, there might be a
more supportable chain of reasoning not dependent on defendant
having introduced evidence of his good character:
EVIDENCE: Defendant committed a number of crimes with
Bonnie Kelly, one of the confessed killers, and with her husband
Mike Kelly, whom the murder victim recently had prosecuted
successfully.
-INFERENCE: Defendant knew and felt an allegiance to-
ward the Kellys.
-->INFERENCE: Defendant had a motive to act in a way
consistent with the wishes and interests of the Kellys.
--)CONCLUSION: Defendant transferred the weapon
to the victim's killers and did so with knowledge of how they
planned to use it.
This reasoning does not involve defendant's character, though it
does, of course, rely on the same kind of motive-based propensity in-
ference as in virtually all cases discussed in this section. That is, for
the evidence to be useful, one must infer that any person who has a
motive to act in favor of a particular party would have a tendency to
act in accordance with that motive. Because this inference does not
depend on a judgment of the person's character, however, it is not
forbidden by the character rule. Thus, the evidence in Vance might
have been admissible, though not on the reasoning set forth by the
court.
216. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 21, at 432-33.
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C. The Use of Motive to Prove that a Person Acted with a
Required Mental State
Apparently, the most common use of motive evidence, as
proved by means of uncharged misconduct, is to demonstrate that a
person acted with a mental state required by the substantive law.21
7
An early twentieth century evidence handbook states:
It may be said then, that motive is the inducement to intent,
.... The rule is that when intent is relevant and material,
any similar act or transaction committed by the accused
which tends to show the motive of the criminal act charged
may be shown, even though it may establish the commis-
sion of another offense not charged. 18
It is not possible to catalog all of the situations in which courts
have sanctioned admission of uncharged misconduct evidence to
prove motive as a link in the chain leading to the requisite mental
state. However, some common patterns can be identified.
1. Evidence of other acts tending to show a financial motive
to commit a charged act
We have already seen that financial gain can motivate a person
to engage in misconduct.219 Thus, where defendant concededly par-
ticipated in the relevant event but claims no unlawful intent, evi-
dence of other misconduct tending to show a motive to commit the
unlawful act might be admissible. Such evidence has long been ad-
mitted in arson cases, where the prosecution offers uncharged mis-
conduct evidence to prove that defendant set the fire intentionally for
the purpose of collecting the proceeds of a fire insurance policy.
In State v. Harris,220 for example, defendant was convicted of
burning a barn and its contents with the intent of defrauding an in-
surance company. On appeal, defendant claimed the trial court erred
217. See 22 id. at481.
218. LESLIE J. TOMPKINS, TRIAL EVIDENCE: THE CHAMBERLAYNE
HANDBOOK § 688, at 657 (1936) (footnote omitted). Despite the categorical
character of the quoted statement, the author noted that not all similar transac-
tions are admissible. See id.
219. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
220. 175 P. 153 (Kan. 1918).
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in allowing the prosecution to prove that about a month before the
charged fire, defendant set fire to a stack of alfalfa on which he had
obtained insurance. The court found no error:
The purpose of the testimony was not to prove another of-
fense, but to show the intent of the defendant in the com-
mission of the offense charged and as an ingredient in that
offense. There was testimony tending to show that defen-
dant had obtained insurance on buildings [and property]
.... Some testimony was offered tending to show that de-
fendant claimed the loss on the alfalfa in excess of its value,
and that other property insured was overvalued. The intent
to defraud the insurer was an essential element of the crime
charged, and any fact or circumstance tending to show the
ingredient of intent is admissible, although it may also tend
to prove the commission by the defendant of an offense
other than the one [charged]. 22'
Numerous courts have applied this reasoning in similar cases.'n
Admission, however, has not been approved universally.223 In some
221. Id. at 154-55.
222. See, e.g., Hinde v. State, 91 N.E. 1090, 1091 (Ind. 1910) (evidence that
shortly before the fire in question the defendant applied for additional insur-
ance covering her hotel furniture, and that four fires, apparently of incendiary
origin, occurred during her four or five month tenancy, was admissible to
prove the accused committed arson in the burning of the hotel); State v. Etten-
berg, 176 N.W. 171, 172 (Minn. 1920) (in prosecution for arson in burning an
insured store, evidence of a similar fire three months earlier was admissible);
State v. McClard, 160 P. 130, 131 (Or. 1916) (similar, uncharged fire occurred
after charged fire; "when the motive or intent of a party constitutes a material
part of the offense charged, and particularly where the intent must necessarily
be fraudulent in order to constitute the crime, evidence of similar acts may be
received to show the intent in the particular case"); Stanley v. State, 171
S.W.2d 406 (Tenn. 1943) (similar;, property destroyed by fire was insured for
greater than its value).
223. See, e.g., State v. Raymond, 21 A. 328, 330 (N.J. 1891) (in prosecution
for burning a building with intent to defraud insurers, evidence that between
five and eleven years earlier, several other buildings in which defendant had an
interest were burned was inadmissible on the question of whether the fire at
issue was set accidentally; for admission to be justified, "[tihere must appear,
between the extraneous crime offered in evidence and the crime of which the
defendant is accused, some other real connection, beyond the allegation that
they have both sprung from the same vicious disposition"); People v. Smith, 56
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arson cases, courts have admitted evidence of other fires purportedly
to prove intent, but where intent was not a contested issue.2 24 The
reasoning of these cases might therefore be flawed because the evi-
dence actually might have been relevant to another ultimate fact,
such as identity.
Although arson/insurance fraud prosecutions constitute an obvi-
ous class of cases in which the motive-to-state of mind theory might
apply, it could apply whenever financial gain might motivate a per-
son to act in a certain way. Any type of case sounding in fraud
would potentially qualify. Thus, in United States v. Lambinus,
225
defendant was convicted of unauthorized use, acquisition, and pos-
session of food stamps. On appeal, defendant claimed the trial court
erred in admitting evidence that he sold the food stamps. The court
held that admission was not error: "[E]vidence of what he had done
with the stamps, coupled with the inference that he had obtained a
profit upon their sale, shows his intent, knowledge, and motive for
accepting the food stamps. 226
In United States v. O'Brien,227 defendant was charged with bank
and wire fraud in connection with the sale of a business. Specifi-
cally, the government alleged that defendant orchestrated the sale of
the business in such a way that the buyer issued a check without
learning that certain liens against the assets of the business had not
been paid off. At trial, the court allowed the government to present
evidence of a fire that had destroyed insured property, and that de-
fendant had used the insurance proceeds for personal purposes rather
than to replace the truck, even though a bank held a lien on the truck.
On appeal, the court found no error in admission of this evidence be-
cause it tended to show a motive to divert business funds to personal
N.E. 1001, 1003-04 (N.Y. 1900) (similar; prosecutor's comments suggesting
other fires in buildings with which defendant was connected were improper).
224. See, e.g., Regina v. Regan, 4 Cox C.C. 335, 335 (1850) (in prosecution
for maliciously setting fire to building with intent to injure one Adams, where
prosecution claimed defendant acted on a motive to obtain reward for reporting
fire, evidence of other fires defendant had reported and for which he had re-
ceived rewards was admissible to prove intent; close reading of facts suggests,
however, that real issue was identity of perpetrator, not intent).
225. 747 F.2d 592, 592-97 (10th Cir. 1984).
226. Id. at 597.
227. 119 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 1997).
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use. 28 Though the court did not explain its reasoning completely, it
appears to have held that the evidence was admissible to show that
defendant had acted on a motive to obtain financial advantage, and
that when she misled the buyer about the liens on the business, she
did so with the same kind of fraudulent intent.229
The facts of Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Coip.3 0 offer an in-
teresting variation on the use of uncharged misconduct to prove
intent in a fraud context. Gastineau sued Fleet, for which he had
worked as a loan originator, for sexual discrimination. Plaintiff al-
leged that he complained several times that he was being harassed by
a loan processor who, among other things, demanded sex in ex-
change for processing loan applications taken by the plaintiff. At
trial, plaintiff produced a memorandum allegedly written by Trimble,
the manager to whom he complained. In the memo, the manager
admitted that the harassment was taking place but stated that because
it was easier to hire loan originators than loan processors, she would
fire plaintiff instead of the processor. Trimble claimed that the
memorandum was a forgery. The defense was essentially that plain-
tiff's claim was part of a pattern of behavior in which he would fab-
ricate charges against former employers. To prove that plaintiff fab-
ricated the claim, the court allowed defendant to offer evidence that
plaintiff had sued three former employers, in each case claiming
violation of a term of employment.23 In addition, defendant offered
an allegedly forged document which plaintiff had attempted to use in
228. See id. at 529.
229. See id.; see also United States v. Sandow, 78 F.3d 388, 391-92 (8th Cir.
1996) (in prosecution of insurance broker for, inter alia, fraud in connection
with insurance and annuity pledge schemes, evidence of civil judgments
against defendant and that defendant wrote checks in satisfaction ofjudgments
was admissible to show defendant's motive; evidence demonstrated defen-
dant's need for money at the time he induced the victim unknowingly to pledge
annuities to him; the evidence, in turn, tended to show defendant's criminal
intent); United States v. Shriver, 842 F.2d 968, 974 (7th Cir. 1988) (evidence
that business owner failed to comply with terms of a franchise agreement was
admissible to show that the business was failing, evidencing a motive to make
a false statement to the bank).
230. 137 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1998).
231. See id. at 494-95.
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his action against one of the former employers. The trial court
admitted the evidence to prove, inter alia, plaintiff's motive.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed. The court held that the
allegedly forged document used in another claim was admissible
both because it showed a common scheme or plan to use false docu-
ments in anticipation of litigation, and because it "shows Gastineau's
motive in creating false documents as revenge against former em-
ployers and the hope of monetary gain.' '2 32 Evidence of the three
prior lawsuits was admissible to show, among other things, "Gas-
tineau's vindictive state of mind regarding his employers."233 The
theory is that the evidence showed plaintiffs motive in filing the
claim, and from that, the invalidity of the claim. It demonstrated a
state of mind inconsistent with a valid claim.
2. Evidence of other acts tending to show enmity toward
victim of charged offense
Evidence that a person harbored ill will toward a particular per-
son or group of people can demonstrate a motive to act against the
person or persons, and from that fact, the intent with which the
charged act was committed. Anything can potentially serve as the
source of the animosity. In United States v. Woodlee,234 the source
was racial prejudice. Defendants were charged with violently inter-
fering with enjoyment of a public facility based on race, a crime re-
quiring proof, inter alia, that the attack on the victim was motivated
by the victim's race, color, religion, or national origin. 35 Appar-
ently, identity was not in dispute, though defendants' intent was.
Testimony showed that on the evening in question, the white defen-
dants threatened and intimidated the African American victims in a
bar, and later chased the victims' car and shot at them, causing in-
jury. To prove that James Woodlee, one of the defendants, was mo-
tivated by racial hatred, the prosecution offered evidence that about a
week before the incident, Woodlee told another person that he was
planning to accompany some friends on an outing, but that he had
232. Id. at 495.
233. Id.
234. 136 F.3d 1399 (10th Cir. 1998).
235. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(F) (1994).
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refused to go when he learned that a woman of "mixed race" would
also attend.2 6 On appeal, the court held that the trial court properly
admitted this evidence to prove Woodlee's motive and intent. The
court was correct, and the reasoning is simple: The evidence
strongly suggested that his actions were motivated by the type of
animosity required by the statute. Although other evidence presented
at trial also tended to show Woodlee's racial animosity toward the
victims,237 the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the
evidence of Woodlee's earlier comments2 8
Sometimes, the animosity is more personal. In People it
Gardner,239 defendant was charged with assault and retaliation
against a witness. The victim was struck and injured by a cardboard
display as she worked. An issue at trial was whether the display was
deliberately thrown or accidentally knocked over. The victim had
been a government witness in two trials of defendant's husband for
fraud and deceit. To prove that defendant intentionally struck the
victim with the display, the prosecution offered evidence that before
the trials in those cases, defendant approached the victim and asked
the victim to testify that she could not identify defendant's husband
as the person who had committed the crimes.240 Apparently, the vic-
tim did not heed this request; she testified against defendant's hus-
band, and he was convicted in both trials. The trial court admitted
the evidence concerning the earlier conversation for the limited pur-
pose of establishing defendant's motive and intent, and the appellate
court affirmed. Once again, the decision is correct. Evidence that
defendant wanted the victim to testify favorably in her husband's
criminal trial, together with the victim's unwillingness to do so,
236. See Woodlee, 136 F.3d at 1410.
237. Woodlee uttered a number of highly charged racial slurs in the bar that
evening. See id. at 1403.
238. See id. at 1410-11; see also United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183
(10th Cir. 1983) (in prosecution for murder of two African American men,
evidence of defendant's assault on an interracial couple four years earlier was
admissible to prove the murders were racially motivated).
239. 919 P.2d 850 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
240. See id. at 855. Defendant testified that a conversation about the up-
coming trial took place, but denied that she asked the victim to say that she did
not recognize defendant's husband as the perpetrator. See id.
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logically gives rise to a feeling of ill will toward the victim, and
therefore makes it somewhat more likely that defendant intentionally
injured the victim on the charged occasion.24'
In People v. Coit,24 2 the source of animosity was the prior rela-
tionship of the defendant and the victim, 243 and the fact that the two
were embroiled in litigation concerning an investment. The trial
court admitted this evidence to prove intent by showing a motive to
commit the murder. The appellate court affirmed, though it never
made clear that intent was in fact an issue in the case. Similarly, in
United States v. Wynn,244 defendant's conviction of causing another
person to use an interstate facility to solicit murder was affirmed af-
ter a trial in which the victim, defendant's ex-wife, was permitted to
testify that defendant had made threats against her life and had at-
tempted to kill her. The appellate court held that the evidence was
admissible to show defendant's intent.245 Presumably, the evidence
showed enmity toward the victim, which led to a motive to commit
the charged crime, and from the motive, intent. As in Coit, the court
did not make clear the basis of the defense. If it was lack of intent,
the evidence was analyzed properly. If it was misidentification or
that no one had solicited the victim's murder, the court should have
examined the evidence on that basis instead.246
In recent years, a number of cases have approved evidence of
gang affiliation to establish a motive, and from that fact, criminal
241. Note that in this case, the government could have demonstrated a mo-
tive simply by showing that the victim had testified against defendant's hus-
band. Without hearing that defendant had specifically asked the victim not to
implicate her husband, however, the jury would be denied evidence suggesting
how strongly defendant was motivated to retaliate against the victim. In other
words, the evidence presented had higher probative value than would evidence
that the victim previously had testified against defendant's husband.
242. 961 P.2d 524 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
243. Defendant and the victim were previously married. The evidence also
concerned defendant's making of false claims that she was pregnant, engaging
in bigamy, and commission of other fraudulent acts. See id. at 529.
244. 987 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1993).
245. See id. at 356.
246. Coit and Wynn are discussed further infra at notes 264-67 and accom-
panying text
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intent, in prosecutions for various crimes. In People v. Mendoza,247
for example, defendant was charged with the murder of a member of
the "Crips" gang. The killing took place following an argument.
Though not made completely clear in the court's opinion, it can be
assumed that the defendant claimed he acted in self-defense. At trial,
the prosecution sought to demonstrate defendant's membership in the
rival "Bloods" gang by offering certain physical evidence associated
with that group.248 Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court
should not have admitted the evidence. The court found no error,
holding that "[p]roof of intent to kill was a necessary part of the
prosecution's case, and the evidence of the defendant's gang affilia-
tion, which tended to prove the existence of such a motive for killing
the victim, was relevant .... 249 The court continued:
[T]he fact of the defendant's gang affiliation could have
shown a motive to commit the crime. The evidence was not
offered to prove that the defendant was more likely to kill
because he was a gang member; rather, it was offered to
show that, because of his membership in a particular gang,
defendant was more likely to murder this particular victim
after deliberation. The evidence of gang affiliation, there-
fore, was necessary for the prosecution's case of first-
degree murder.25°
Thus, in Mendoza, ill will between a group with which defendant
was affiliated and a rival group provided a motive to act with delib-
eration. This, in turn, tended to establish defendant's potential guilt
of first-degree murder.2 '
Similar theories have been used in other cases involving gang
activity. In People v. Marquantte,252 for example, defendant was
convicted of murdering one victim and for assault and attempted
247. 876 P.2d 98 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
248. See id. at 102. The evidence consisted of the testimony of a police offi-
cer, photographs, and a notebook containing rap music, lyrics, and a drawing
of a gun. The prosecutor also remarked during closing argument that there was
an "explosive relationship" between the "Bloods" and the "Crips." See id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 103.
251. The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder. See id. at 100.
252. 923 P.2d 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4 WREVIEW
murder of a second person. Defendant was a gang member, and the
victims were members of a rival gang. Defendant admitted shooting
the victims but claimed he acted in self-defense. At trial, the court
permitted the prosecution to present evidence of defendant's prior
violent acts, specifically, his violent initiation of a young gang mem-
ber and his violent action against that same person immediately after
the events at issue. The court held the evidence admissible to sup-
port the prosecution's theory that defendant committed the charged
crimes to protect the younger gang member and to set an example for
him25 3 Thus, the acts tended to prove defendant's motive to act in-
tentionally in killing the victim.
254
In some cases, the courts have admitted uncharged misconduct
evidence on a theory of motive based on animosity to prove intent,
when intent is either uncontested or not the basis of the defense. In
People v. Curtis,55 for example, defendant was charged with assault
with a deadly weapon. 56 His defense was an alibi. On appeal of his
conviction, defendant claimed the trial court should not have per-
mitted the victim to testify that defendant had previously assaulted
him.2 57 The court held that the evidence was properly admitted be-
cause it was "probative of malice and ill toward the victim.', 258 Had
defendant admitted committing the act but claimed it was an accident
or that it was committed in self-defense,259 the court's reasoning
would be logical. However, defendant sought to establish an alibi.
By implication, therefore, he did not contest intent;260 he merely
253. See id. at 184.
254. See id.; see also United States v. Sills, 120 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 1997)
(evidence of defendant's gang-related activities was admissible to show defen-
dant's knowledge of and intent to possess the firearm found in a car inscribed
with gang markings; evidence tended to show a motive and opportunity to
have a firearm).
255. 657 P.2d 990 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
256. See id. at 991.
257. See id. at 992.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Douglas v. People, 969 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Colo. 1998) (evi-
dence that defendant had previously threatened his girlfriend, the alleged vic-
tim in the charged case, was admissible to prove intent for felony menacing).
260. It is true that even if the defense is based on the absence of one element
of the crime rather than another, the prosecution is required to prove all ele-
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claimed that he was not the person who committed the crime, if in-
deed there was a crime. Under these circumstances, the court should
have examined whether the evidence was relevant to identity.
Though admission under that theory might have been justifiable,
261
the proper course would have been to analyze its admissibility on
that basis instead of the inapplicable theory of motive-to-intent.
262
Some courts have been careful to point out that when intent is
uncontested, the evidence generally should not be admitted under
that theory.
263
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970), and may prove each element with any otherwise admissible evidence.
See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). However, factors in de-
termining admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence include the need for
the evidence and the potential for unfair prejudice, and when an issue is
uncontested, the need is often minimized and the prejudice factor weighs more
heavily. See, e.g., State v. Conley, 873 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Mo. 1994) (trial
court erred in permitting the prosecution to offer evidence of other crimes to
establish intent because intent was not a legitimate issue in prosecution for
sodomy, sexual assault, and attempted sodomy; the evidence was thus unnec-
essary, and its probative value was "far outweighed" by its prejudicial effect).
261. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text (discussing admissibil-
ity of uncharged misconduct showing a motive based on animosity and, from
that fact, the identity of the actor).
262. See also Shuffield v. State, 179 S.W. 650 (Ark. 1915). Defendant was
charged with arson for burning a barn owned by the town constable. On the
night of the fire, in an effort to quell a disturbance, the constable had searched
many people including defendant and an alleged accomplice. The prosecution
also offered evidence that after the incident with the constable, defendant and
an accomplice had set fire to a fence and some corntops owned by a man who
assisted the sheriff. On appeal, the court held that the evidence of the other
fires set by defendant was relevant to both the "motive or intent of the defen-
dant" and whether the charged fire was of incendiary origin. Id. at 651. Be-
cause defendant did not base his defense on lack of intent, but denied involve-
ment in the charged crime, the evidence should not have been admitted to
prove his state of mind, though it might have been admissible to prove identity.
The court held the evidence should have been excluded, but for another rea-
son--that it was offered in the form of inadmissible hearsay. See id. at 652.
263. See, e.g., Conley, 873 S.W.2d at 237 (in prosecution for sodomy, sexual
assault, and attempted sodomy, trial court should not have admitted evidence
of uncharged sexual acts to prove intent (through common scheme or plan) be-
cause intent was not a legitimate issue). The court held that
[w]hen there is direct evidence that the defendant committed the illicit
act, the proof of the act ordinarily gives rise to an inference of the nec-
essary mens rea. No other evidence is required to establish that ele-
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In other cases, courts have left unclear the nature of the defense.
In Coit, discussed previously,264 defendant was convicted of first-
degree murder and conspiracy following a trial at which the jury
heard details of defendant's prior relationship with the victim, big-
amy, and fraudulent behavior,2 65 as well as of an acrimonious civil
lawsuit between the two. The appellate court affirmed, holding that
the evidence was admissible to prove the prosecution's theory that
"defendant murdered the victim to prevent exposure of this evidence
in the civil trial and thus established a motive for the killing."
266
However, the court never made clear whether the defense was based
on lack of criminal intent or on misidentification of the killer. If de-
fendant did not contest the killing but claimed she lacked the state of
mind for murder, the evidence certainly would have been relevant,
and likely admissible despite a risk of unfair prejudice from the
jury's possible tendency to use the evidence to establish guilt by
character. But it seems more likely that defendant claimed she did
not commit the killing, thus making the evidence admissible, if at all,
to prove identity, not intent.267
3. Evidence of other acts tending to show motive and intent in
employment discrimination cases
When a former employee brings an action alleging unlawful
employment discrimination, an element of the prima facie case is the
employer's intent to discriminate. 268  Because the employer's
ment of the case unless the state has some reason to believe that the
defendant will make intent or mistake or accident an issue in the case
because its probative value is far outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. at
237.
264. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
265. See Coit, 961 P.2d at 524. The evidence included testimony about de-
fendant's allegedly bigamous marriage, false claims of pregnancy, and other
false and fraudulent activities. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
266. Coit, 961 P.2d at 529.
267. See Wynn, 987 F.2d at 354 (in prosecution for solicitation of murder,
evidence of prior threats and assaults against victim admitted to prove intent
even though the court did not make clear that intent was at issue); see also su-
pra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
268. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55
(1981) (in employment discrimination case, plaintiff must prove intentional
discrimination in workplace).
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motivation generally cannot be proven directly, it is usually neces-
sary to resort to circumstantial evidence to prove that element of the
prima facie case. One form such evidence might take is other in-
stances of misconduct by the employer indicating discriminatory
motivation. The admissibility theory in these cases is similar to that
of other cases in which uncharged misconduct is offered to show
enmity toward a person or group.
In Garvey v. Dickinson College,269 a former professor brought
suit alleging sexual harassment and gender discrimination while she
was employed as a professor at the college.270 Prior to trial, defen-
dants moved to preclude admission of evidence of the supervisor's
alleged harassment of others. The court denied the motion, noting
the lack of direct evidence:
In an employment discrimination case, evidence that, e.g.,
the defendant has made disparaging remarks about the class
of persons to which plaintiff belongs, may be introduced to
show that the defendant harbors prejudice toward that
group. Such evidence is often the only proof of defendant's
state of mind, and if it were excluded, plaintiff would have
no means of proving that the defendant acted with discrimi-
natory intent.27'
Thus, evidence of the supervisor's harassment of others was relevant
because it "tends to show his attitude toward women and his treat-
ment of them at the college., 272 Other courts have reached similar
conclusions.
273
269. 763 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
270. See id. at 800.
271. Id. at 801.
272. Id. The court held, however, that evidence of other instances of har-
assment by the supervisor would be limited to those involving persons in the
drama department, the department in which plaintiff worked. See id. at 802.
The court also reserved for trial a determination of whether the probative value
of any instances of conduct would be substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. See id.
273. See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 164 F.3d 1186, 1188-89 (9th Cir.
1998) (in employment discrimination action against state university law
school, trial court erred in excluding evidence of other biased behavior by
same professor).
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In employment-related cases, plaintiff is not always successful
in seeking admission of evidence of past behavior indicative of mo-
tive and thus intent. In Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control,27 4 a wrong-
ful termination case, plaintiff wished to offer testimony of two for-
mer employees regarding the circumstances of their discharges,
which occurred after plaintiffs firing. Plaintiff argued that the evi-
dence would show a pattern of retaliatory conduct against employees
who made workers' compensation claims. The trial court excluded
the evidence, and the appellate court affirmed. The court recognized
that testimony of other employees about their treatment is relevant to
the issue of discriminatory intent if it establishes a pattern of retalia-
tory behavior or discredits the employer's assertion of legitimate
motives. 275 However, in the current case, the court refused to over-
turn the trial judge's determination that the prejudicial effect of such
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice.276
4. Evidence of other acts tending to show need for or motive to
obtain money
In some cases, uncharged misconduct helps to explain why cer-
tain conduct that might appear innocent could in fact be criminal or
actionable. In United States v. Boyd,277 for example, defendant was
charged, inter alia, with possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute and conspiracy to do the same. At trial, the government of-
fered evidence that defendant personally used marijuana and co-
caine. 78 The purpose of the evidence was to show a financial
274. 165 F.3d 767 (10th Cir. 1999).
275. See id. at 776-77.
276. See id. The court noted that the two employees whose testimony plain-
tiff offered were terminated after plaintiff, and stated that "[tlestimony about
later events is even less relevant and of less probative value than evidence of
prior bad acts generally, because the logical relationship between the circum-
stances of the character testimony and the employer's decision to terminate is
attenuated." Id. at 777. This rationale is questionable. There is no reason to
assume that generally speaking, later uncharged misconduct is less probative of
an issue other than character than is prior misconduct.
277. 53 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 1995).
278. See id. at 636.
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motive to participate in the drug conspiracies: to obtain money to
purchase drugs for his own use.279 On appeal of his conviction, the
court affirmed. Though the court did not make its reasoning explicit,
at least three legitimate lines of reasoning would support the result.
First, the evidence would be relevant to the actus reus of the crime.
The reasoning would be as follows:
EVIDENCE: Defendant used marijuana and cocaine.
-)INFERENCE: Defendant had a need for and thus a motive
to obtain money to finance his drug use.
-)CONCLUSION: Defendant became involved in the
conspiracy as a source of funds for his drug use.2 0
Under this reasoning, the evidence ultimately does not go to intent,
but to defendant's commission of the act itself. If, for example, de-
fendant admitted being present in the place where drugs were found
but denied possession or any other involvement with the drugs, the
evidence would be relevant to that essential element of the crime.
A second chain of reasoning leads to the identity of defendant as
a member of the conspiracy, also an essential element of the crime.
If, for example, defendant claims that he was misidentified-that the
police arrested the wrong person--4he evidence would be relevant as
follows:
EVIDENCE: Defendant used marijuana and cocaine.
-INFERENCE: Defendant had a need for and thus a motive
to obtain money to finance his drug use.
279. See id. at 637.
280. This and the other theories to be discussed could also be used to show a
motive simply to have access to a supply of marijuana for personal use. See
United States v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1992) (evidence of
defendant's cocaine use relevant to prove motive to distribute cocaine to fi-
nance his drug use and assure a ready supply of the drug).
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-)CONCLUSION: Defendant was correctly identified as a
participant in the crimes.
A third chain of reasoning leads, ultimately, to intent:
EVIDENCE: Defendant used marijuana and cocaine.
-)INFERENCE: Defendant had a need for and thus a motive
to obtain money to finance his drug use.
-)CONCLUSION: Defendant's possession of the mari-
juana on the charged occasions was for the purpose of distri-
bution as a source of funds for his drug use.
Here, the evidence explains why defendant's conduct constituted the
commission of the crimes of distribution and conspiracy to distribute.
It is thus relevant to defendant's criminal intent, an essential element
of the charged crimes.
The Boyd court did not make clear whether the ultimate purpose
of the evidence was to prove the act, identity, intent, or some combi-
nation of these elements, but the evidence is relevant for all three
purposes. The propriety of the court's admission of the evidence
would depend on many factors including whether the issue on which
the evidence was offered was contested, but the evidence passes
relevance scrutiny on all stated counts.
5. Evidence of other acts to complete the factual story
and prove that criminal motivation and intent
accompanied behavior at issue
As the foregoing discussion shows, in many cases the reasons
for a person's behavior are not evident from the conduct itself, which
can be interpreted consistently with either innocence or guilt. In
such cases, uncharged misconduct evidence sometimes helps to
make the evidence more comprehensible. In United States v. Sri-
yuth,28' for example, defendant was convicted of kidnapping and
281. 98 F.3d 739 (3d Cir. 1996).
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using a firearm in relation to a kidnapping. The alleged victim was
the subject of a marriage arranged according to Laotian custom.
282
Defendant claimed that the woman consented, and pointed to her
failure to avail herself of a number of opportunities to escape or no-
tify the authorities.9 3 To prove defendant's motive and the victim's
lack of consent, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present
evidence that defendant raped the victim in the course of the events
at issue.2 84 On appeal of his conviction, defendant argued that ad-
mission of this evidence constituted error, but the court affirmed,
holding the evidence admissible to prove defendant's motive and the
victim's lack of consent.285 To examine the motive reasoning, the
rape tends to show that defendant was motivated by a desire for rape
or sexual gratification rather than to carry out the arranged mar-
riage.29 6
The court in United States v. MurrayP7 employed a somewhat
similar theory. Defendant was charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. 288 Police found the firearm in defendant's
car when they stopped him after suspecting the presence of drugs. 219
At the time of his arrest, defendant claimed he did not know who
owned the gun.290 To prove defendant possessed the gun, the prose-
cution offered evidence that police also found crack cocaine in the
car.291 The court held the evidence admissible to provide a complete
282. See id. at 742.
283. See id. at 747 n.13.
284. See id. at 741-47.
285. See id. at 747. The court also held that the rape was not another crime
at all, but a necessary part of the defendant's exercise of dominion over the
victim. See id. (citing United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708-09 (9th
Cir. 1982)). Evidence of sexual activity with a child victim was admissible to
show defendant's dominion over the victim, and thus explain the victim's ac-
tions in going with defendant.
286. The court noted that because motive is relevant, it was not necessary to
determine whether the kidnapping statute required proof of a particular motive
or purpose. See id. at 747 n.12.
287. 89 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1996).
288. See id. at 460.
289. See id. at461.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 462.
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picture of the events. 92 The court explained:
When the evidence of the crack cocaine.., was introduced,
the jury could better understand that Murray may indeed
have made a drug purchase while the officers watched, and
they could better understand why Murray might want to be
armed. The evidence, in short, gave the jury a more com-
plete story concerning the charged crime. 93
When jurors viewed the evidence in context, then, they would better
appreciate the possibility that defendant would possess a weapon be-
cause they would understand the motive to do so.
2 94
Though application of the theory under consideration here is
highly fact-specific, traces of it can be found in other cases as well.
The common element of the cases is the idea that the uncharged mis-
conduct evidence helps to supply the reason-otherwise difficult to
discern-why the prosecution's theory of criminal intent is valid.295
One of the more notorious cases that appears to have employed
reasoning of the type under consideration here is United States v.
Haldeman,296 a prosecution of three high-ranking officials in the
Nixon administration arising from the cover-up of the Watergate af-
fair. At trial, the prosecution offered evidence that defendants had
authorized the illegal break-in of the office of a psychiatrist who had
been treating Daniel Ellsberg, a leading policy.critic. 297 The prose-
cution's theory was that the break-in demonstrated a motive to
292. See id. at 463.
293. Id.
294. The court also suggested that the firearm evidence was so "'intricately
related to the facts of the case"' that it was not actually an extrinsic bad act
subject to the requirements of Rule 404(b). Id. at 462-63 (hinging admissibil-
ity of the evidence on a determination that "its absence would create a
'chronological or conceptual void' in the story of the crime" (quoting United
States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1424-25 (7th Cir. 1984)).
295. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 53 F.3d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1995)
(in prosecution for, inter alia, possession and use of a firearm equipped with a
silencer in relation to drug trafficking where defendant claimed his presence in
the place where the contraband was found was innocent, evidence that defen-
dant was a supplier of narcotics to organized crime showed a motive to be in
the apartment where the guns and drugs were stored).
296. 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
297. See id. at 88.
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engage in the charged cover-up. Specifically, the government al-
leged that defendants engaged in a cover-up of the Watergate affair
in part to prevent revelation of the psychiatrist's office break-in, a
revelation that would be extremely damaging to the administra-
tion.2 98 Though defendants argued that the probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, the appellate court held that the trial court did not err in admit-
ting the evidence, as it tended to show a clear connection between
the office break-in and the Watergate cover-up. 99 As the court
wrote, in part:
It could be concluded from the Hunt Memorandum... and
the payment of money thereafter that concealing responsi-
bility for the Ellsberg break-in was part of the motivation
for the payment of money to those involved in Watergate.
The desire on the part of appellants to conceal the Ellsberg
break-in was clearly indicative of a motive to conceal the
identities of higher-ups involved in the Watergate break-in
.. because some of those who participated in the former
operation were also in the latter and any reasonable person
would suspect that if the names of the participants in either
venture were discovered, such fact might lead investigators
to the identities of those persons participating in the plan-
ning, execution, or concealment of the other crime.300
Though the court never made the matter clear, it appears to have
viewed the evidence of the break-in of the psychiatrist's office to
help explain what was going through the minds of the Watergate
conspirators. In that sense, the evidence helped to clarify the very
complex series of events that collectively came to be known as
"Watergate."
In some cases, it is difficult to justify the court's decision to ad-
mit the uncharged misconduct evidence on the type of theory de-
scribed here. In United States v. Jones,30' for example, defendant
was charged in connection with a heroin and cocaine distribution
298. See id.
299. See id. at 88-90.
300. Id. at 89 (footnote omitted).
301. 145 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 1998).
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conspiracy. Defendant, a street-level dealer, was the only member of
the conspiracy to go to trial; all others, including the ring-leaders,
pleaded guilty. At trial, the prosecution was permitted to elicit testi-
mony indicating that defendant had sold drugs after the charged con-
spiracy had ended. On appeal, the court found no error, holding that
in drug prosecutions, evidence of similar drug activity is admissible
to establish intent or motive to commit the charged crime.3 2 The
court noted that the later activity was "similar in kind and close in
time to the drug activity Jones engaged in while a member of the
conspiracy charged in the indictment."303
How does the uncharged misconduct evidence in Jones tend to
establish "intent or motive"? Absent a theory that defendant had a
motive to obtain money or drugs, or that he had a particular reason to
be involved with the drug conspiracy, it is difficult to imagine how
the evidence was relevant to defendant's guilt of the crime except by
means of the forbidden character inference; a person who would deal
drugs shortly after the conspiracy ended is more likely to have been
involved in the conspiracy. Therefore, Jones arguably crosses the
line between permissible noncharacter misconduct evidence and for-
bidden character evidence.
Additionally, courts should carefully scrutinize uncharged mis-
conduct evidence that is allegedly "intricately related" to the charged
offense, or offered to "complete the story," provide factual context,
or explain the otherwise unexplainable. Often, the real impact of the
evidence is to invite the jury to apply the forbidden character infer-
ence, convicting the defendant for the uncharged conduct, or perhaps
simply because the defendant appears to be a criminal type who
should be separated from free society. The mere proximity in time
of the uncharged to the charged events is not a reason to admit the
former. Also, in many ambiguous situations, a factfinder can be
educated without exposing it to damaging evidence that invites un-
fair prejudice.
302. See id. at 961-64.
303. Id. at 964.
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IV. THE MoTIvE THEORY iN CuNwNGHAM
We return now to the story that began this analysis: the nurse
accused of stealing Demerol from the hospital medicine cabinet.
304
The issue in the case was the perpetrator's identity. 05 Recall that the
court permitted the prosecution to present evidence that four years
earlier, she had been addicted to Demerol, had stolen it from a prior
employer, had been suspended from practice, and had falsified the
results of drug tests given as a condition of restoration of her li-
cense.31 6 On appeal, the court held that the evidence was admissible
on a "motive" theory, explaining that "[m]ost people don't want
Demerol; being a Demerol addict gave Cunningham a motive to
tamper with the Demerol-filled syringes .... 21
3o7
The court's motive theory in Cunningham appears to have rested
on the following chain of inferences:
EVIDENCE: Four years earlier, Cunningham had been addicted
to Demerol, had stolen it from a prior employer, had been sus-
pended from practice, and had falsified required drug tests.
308
--)NFERENCE 1: Cunningham either continued to be ad-
dicted to Demerol, or again became addicted, at the time of
the currently charged crime.
-)INFERENCE 2: Cunningham had a motive to steal the
Demerol from the locked medicine cabinet.
-CONCLUSION: Cunningham stole the Demerol
from the locked cabinet.
30 9
304. See United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1996).
305. See id. at 555. There was no dispute that the drug had been stolen or
that the actor possessed the requisite intent See id.
306. See id.at556.
307. Id. at557.
308. See id. at 556.
309. Note that this conclusion might actually be stated as a matter of prob-
ability; that Cunningham is more likely to have stolen the Demerol than the
other nurses who had access to the locked cabinet.
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None of the motive-to-identity theories discussed earlier310 ex-
actly fits the facts of Cunningham. The cases that come closest are
those in which the person has a motive to obtain money, usually in
order to obtain drugs. 311 In those cases, to assess whether the chain
of reasoning from the drug use to the theft successfully avoids the
use of a character inference, it is necessary to examine how one leaps
from one inference to another. To do so, one must uncover the gen-
eralization, or what Morgan called the "unarticulated premise,"
312
that a reasonable person might apply when thinking about the evi-
dence. For example, suppose that D, who has no apparent means of
support, is charged with bank robbery. D denies involvement. To
prove D's participation, the prosecution wishes to present evidence
that D is addicted to heroin. The motive reasoning, complete with
generalizations, would be as follows:
EVIDENCE: D, who has no apparent means of support, is ad-
dicted to heroin.
--)INFERENCE: D had a motive to commit robbery to obtain
money to buy heroin.
GENERALIZATION: A person who is addicted to a drug
and who has no legitimate source of funds, is more likely to
have a motive to steal money with which to purchase the drug
than a person randomly chosen from the population.
-4CONCLUSION D acted on the motive by robbing
the bank.
GENERALIZATION: A person who has a motive to
steal is more likely to rob a bank than is one without such a mo-
tive.
310. See supra notes 85-164 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text.
312. 1 EDMuND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 162 (Charles
E. Clark ed., 1954).
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This reasoning is quite straightforward and does not depend on the
application of a character-based propensity inference. The inference
is not personal to D. In our society, virtually anyone with a need for
money would have a motive to obtain it. Because the existence of
the motive does not depend on a particular trait of character peculiar
to D, and not the general population, the first leap-from the facts of
poverty and a drug addiction to the existence of the motive-is easy
to make. Put differently, the evidence has high probative value on
this first inference.
The second leap-from the existence of a motive to taking ac-
tion upon it-is, of course, considerably more difficult. Indeed, one
might argue that in a non-police-state, social order is maintained only
by the constraint which most people feel about such things as bank
robbery. Even among those who possess a motive to steal, few
would actually do so. Thus, the evidence has little probative value
on the ultimate conclusion that D committed bank robbery. Never-
theless, because the evidence has some value, it is relevant, and the
inferential chain is unbroken.
We have demonstrated that the motive reasoning is logically
sound, and that the leap from D's circumstances to the existence of a
motive is not character-based. But we have not established whether
the second inferential step requires the application of character-based
reasoning. To assess that question, it is necessary to ask whether a
drug addict who robs a bank to obtain money for drugs does so be-
cause of an aspect of her character. Assume for the moment that D's
addiction was not to heroin, but to a prescription pain killer such as
codeine, and that the addiction arose during D's recovery from pain-
ful back surgery, when her doctor prescribed codeine to relieve the
pain. Would we think that D's bank robbery to obtain money for co-
deine was character-motivated? Perhaps not. If we are not willing to
blame D's addiction on a character flaw, we also might be willing to
see the bank robbery as an act of desperation that any person in such
a situation, who was of good or bad character, might commit. On
this reasoning, the inference to bank robbery from the codeine ad-
diction would not be character-based. Close examination of the her-
oin addict reveals the same underlying logic; once a person has be-
come addicted to a substance, we are more likely to view that person
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as suffering from disease rather than having bad character. And peo-
ple who act a certain way because of their disease are not bad peo-
ple.3
13
Cunningham is similar. It is possible to move from the fact of
Demerol addiction to the existence of a motive to obtain the drug
without employing a character inference. The generalization would
simply be that any person who is addicted to a drug would have a
motive to obtain it. This is a universal motive, not dependent on a
judgment about Cunningham personally. The second leap-from the
existence of a motive to obtain Demerol to stealing it from the locked
cabinet-also does not require a character-based propensity infer-
ence. If we accept that addiction creates impulses that make im-
proper action more likely for people with addiction, and that addic-
tion is a disease rather than a choice made by a person with a bad
character, then the inference that a person with an addiction is more
likely to steal the drug is not based on character and thus not forbid-
den by the rules.
Therefore, if the nurse in Cunningham was addicted to Demerol
at the time of the charged theft, the motive theory would be valid.
Indeed, it might be even stronger than in our hypothetical case.
There, we have a person stealing from a third party to be able to pur-
chase the drug. This might invite a fact finder to infer that D is the
kind of person who victimizes even those people who do not have
what she ultimately desires. In contrast, Cunningham involves the
simple theft of Demerol. The motive-to-identity theory is relatively
clean.
There is one potentially crucial difference between Cunningham
and our hypothetical that calls into question the validity of the
court's reasoning. In our hypothetical, D's drug addiction is a given
fact. The existence of that addiction allows us to infer a noncharac-
ter based motive to steal, and from that, the possibility of the charged
theft. In Cunningham, on the other hand, only the past addiction was
conceded; Cunningham did not concede that she was currently ad-
dicted. Thus, the past addiction is used, first, to show that
313. For example, we would not blame a Tourette's syndrome sufferer for
her inappropriate verbal outbursts.
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Cunningham continued to be addicted or regained her dependency,
and then to show a motive to steal the Demerol. 314 Does the use of
the past addiction to show the present addiction require a character
inference? If we were considering murder or tax evasion, it certainly
would. Few would argue that one may offer evidence that a person
has murdered in the past to prove that she murdered the current vic-
tim. "Once a murderer, always a murderer" is precisely the type of
reasoning forbidden by the character rule. But is drug addiction the
same? Arguably not. As I have already argued, if drug addiction is a
disease, then the tendency to continue the addiction, or succumb to it
again, is not a matter of choice and thus, not based on character.
True, the evidence of Cunningham's past addiction will only be re-
lated to the charged theft if she was addicted at the later time; but this
is a preliminary question of fact that, for better or worse, the United
States Supreme Court has left to the jury in virtually all situations." 5
In sum, the court in Cunningham has stated a valid, noncharac-
ter theory for admission of Cunningham's prior Demerol addiction31 6
314. That is not to say that there was no evidence of current addiction. Cun-
ningham voluntarily submitted to blood and urine tests for the presence of
Demerol. The blood tested negative but the urine tested positive. See United
States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 1996).
315. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690-91 (1988) (holding
that Federal Rule Evidence 104(b) applies, which requires the court to let the
jury decide the preliminary fact question when there is evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition).
316. One question not addressed here is the relevance of the other evidence
used against Cunningham, specifically the prior theft of Demerol, her suspen-
sion from practice, and her falsification of drug test results. The court rea-
soned-
[T]he suspension ... did not merely duplicate the evidence of Cun-ningham's addiction insinuate a propensity to steal; it also provided
essential background to the evidence of her having falsified the results
of tests required as a condition of regaining her license. That evidence
furnished the basis for an inference that she had falsified the test re-
sults in order to enable her to continue to feed her addiction without
detection and without losing access to a "free" supply of the addictive
substance, and so, like the addiction itself; established motive to tam-
per with the Demerol syringes.
Cunningham, 103 F.3d at 557. This logic is rather convoluted, and even if it is
valid, it seems much more likely that the fact finder would use the evidence of
Cunningham's past theft of Demerol to prove her propensity to steal than
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if one accepts the proposition that falling into drug addiction, and
stealing drugs to feed the addiction, is not a matter of personal char-
acter.
That, however, is exactly the problem with the court's conclu-
sion. The reasoning requires a fact finder who accepts the addiction-
as-disease paradigm, and clearly, not all fact finders will. Many
people firmly believe that addiction is a character flaw, that those
who fall into addiction choose to do so, and that those who become
addicted can quit if they really want to.317 That these assumptions
might be wrong318 does not answer the question. The question is
merely to demonstrate a possibly continuing motive to obtain the drug. If that
is true, the trial court arguably should have excluded the prior theft, as it had
the conviction based upon it. If the prior theft had been excluded, Cunning-
ham's license suspension also should not have been revealed, as it arose from
the theft itself. Finally, evidence of Cunningham's falsification of drug test
results might have been admissible to show her motive to conceal her addiction
and her tendency to act on that motive, and might have been admissible on that
basis. Even if not, the evidence almost certainly would have been admissible
to impeach her credibility if she testified. See FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
317. One is reminded of the congressional testimony of tobacco company
executives that tobacco use is a matter of choice rather than addiction, and that
this is evidenced by the fact that many people quit smoking. For example, the
President and Chief Executive Officer of Philip Morris U.S.A. testified:
Dr. Kessler and some Members of the Subcommittee contended that
nicotine is an addictive drug and that, therefore, smokers are drug ad-
dicts. I object to the premise and to the conclusion.
Cigarettes contain nicotine because it occurs naturally in tobacco.
Nicotine contributes to the taste of cigarettes and the pleasure of
smoking. The presence of nicotine, however, does not make cigarettes
a drug or smoking an addiction.
People can and do quit smoking. According to the 1988 Surgeon
General's Report, there are over 40 million former smokers in the
United States, and 90% of smokers quit on their own, without any out-
side help.
Nicotine and Cigarettes, Subcomm. on Health and the Env't, Hearing Before
the House Energy and Commerce Comm., 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of
William I. Campbell, President and Chief Executive Officer, Philip Morris,
U.S.A.), available at 1994 WL 229351.
318. I say "might be wrong" because the nature of addiction is still a matter
of dispute, even in the scientific community. See Peggy Fulton Hora et al.,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement. Revolt-
tionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse in America,
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whether the risk of trial by character is too great to accept. That
brings us to the question of how to resolve the problem of motive in
cases such as Cunningham. The final section of the Article will con-
sider that question.
V. AN APPROACH TO THE MOTIVE-CHARACTER PROBLEM
In some situations, the distinction between motive and character
is clear. In those cases, the evidence rules provide a clear solution:
Exclude the evidence if it falls into the category of character, even if
it also satisfies a definition of motive, and consider admission if the
evidence consists only of motive, without the need of a character in-
ference. 319 A large number of the fact patterns considered in this
Article raise little difficulty in this respect. Evidence that a person
has killed before is simply not admissible, absent some other con-
nection, to prove that the person killed the present victim. "Once a
murderer, always a murderer" is forbidden logic. On the other end of
the spectrum, evidence that a person had previously manifested ha-
tred toward a specific other person is very likely admissible in a
prosecution for murdering that person. Hatred gives rise to a motive,
and a person with a motive---whatever her character--is more likely
to act violently toward the object of that hatred than is a person ran-
domly chosen.
As Cunningham demonstrates, some cases cannot be resolved so
easily. This can be the result of two types of situations. In one, there
is genuine debate in the relevant scientific field about the nature of
the behavior or mental state alleged to have existed. There is much
uncertainty, for example, about the scientific validity of certain syn-
dromes such as battered child syndrome.320 In other situations, the
74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 439,463-64 (1999).
319. See supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text Even if the evidence is
not barred by the character rule, the court may still exclude it if; for example,
its probative value is greatly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See
supra note 10 and accompanying text
320. The courts are divided, for example, about the admissibility of evidence
of battered child syndrome, partly because of uncertainty about the scientific
basis for its existence. See Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Battered
Child Syndrome on Issue of Self-Defense, 22 A.L.1, 787, 793 (5th ed. 1994 &
Supp. 2000) (noting that most courts have fbcused on whether there is suffi-
cient scientific knowledge to support use of the syndrome and on whether it
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scientific community has more or less settled on the classification of
particular behavior as brought about by medical conditions, but lay
society views the matter with considerably more skepticism. Klep-
tomania is a good example. Among researchers, kleptomania is seen
as a genuine medical condition. 321 A poll of the general population,
however, would almost undoubtedly reveal much skepticism. The
same is true of alcoholism, though perhaps to a lesser degree as more
nonscientists come to accept the possibility of genetic predisposition
and uncontrolled impulses.
From the standpoint of evidence law, these two problems, one
caused by the existence of expert uncertainty, the other by lack of
social acceptance of expert views, might require different treatment.
Where the proposition is not generally disputed in the relevant scien-
tific community, and where the consensus in that community favors
the existence of a medical explanation for a person's behavior or
state of mind, the court should find that the evidence is relevant for
its noncharacter, motive purpose. At that point, the court should de-
termine admissibility according to the generally applicable formula,
which primarily requires a determination, pursuant to the standard of
Rule 403, whether the probative value of the evidence is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, the rele-
vant prejudice would be caused by the jury's refusal to accept the
medical explanation for the person's behavior or state of mind, and
its willingness to convict or find liable on the improper character rea-
soning. If the court believes there is sufficiently great danger that the
jury will do so, despite the issuance of a limiting instruction, the
court should exclude the evidence. In other words, if the court finds
that there does exist a valid, noncharacter chain of reasoning for the
will assist the fact finder).
321. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 612 (4th ed. 1994). According to the American Psy-
chiatric Association, kleptomania is characterized by a repeated fhilure to resist
the impulse to steal things that a person does not need for personal use or even
for their value. See id. Researchers have reported successful treatment of
kleptomania with Serotonin Specific Reuptake Inhibitors, which have been
used for other obsessive-compulsive disorders. See E. Lepkifker et al., The
Treatment of Kleptomania With Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, 22 CLINICAL
NEUROPHARMACOL 40-43 (Jan.-Feb. 1999), at http://biopsychiatry.
com/klepto.htm (abstract only).
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relevance of the uncharged misconduct evidence, the court should
admit the evidence unless it finds that it should be excluded pursuant
to Rule 403. Trial courts have a large amount of responsibility in
these situations because the Rule 403 balance is highly contextual,
and appellate courts review Rule 403 rulings based on an "abuse of
discretion" standard.3 - One cannot expect complete consistency
among courts in making these decisions, but a sincere effort to rule
based on all relevant considerations must be made.
If the court believes that the lay community considers the actor's
character to be the result of character, and that there is genuine de-
bate in the scientific community about the validity of the syndrome
or condition supposedly represented by the relevant behavior or state
of mind, it seems reasonable simply to exclude the evidence. In that
situation, the court will have failed to find a necessary threshold
fact--that the evidence does.not constitute character evidence. Ab-
sent that finding, exclusion should follow. There is simply no suffi-
cient reason to risk violating the long-standing principle that a person
should be judged by what she did on the charged occasion, and not
by the type of person she is.
Applying these standards to Cunningham, it is first necessary to
ask whether there is scientific consensus about the nature of drug ad-
diction. The National Institute on Drug Abuse reports significant
progress over the last quarter century in understanding the nature of
drug use and addiction.323 The clear trend is to treat drug addiction
as a disease of the brain,324 leading to uncontrollable and compulsive
behavior.325 Alan Leshner, director of the National Institute on Drug
322. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 n.7 (1997) ("[O]n
appellate review of a Rule 403 decision, a defendant must establish abuse of
discretion."); DiCarlo v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 211 F.3d 465, 467 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that the appellate court gives "great deference" to the trial
court's Rule 403 determinations).
323. See Donna E. Shalala, Preface to Drug Abuse and Addiction Research:
The Sixth Triennial Report to Congress from the Secretary of Health and Hi-
man Services, available at http./wv.nida.nih.gov/STRC/html (last updated
Dec. 15, 1999).
324. See id.
325. See Alex T. Zakharia, The Mystery of Addiction, Part VII. At the Helm
of Research: Doctor Alan I. Leshner, Director, National Institute on Drug
Abuse, NationalInstitute of Health, MLAMI MED., Sept. 1997, at 15. Dr. Lesh-
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Abuse states:
Recent scientific research provides overwhelming evi-
dence that not only do drugs interfere with normal brain
functioning, creating powerful feelings of pleasure, but they
also have long-term effects on brain metabolism and activ-
ity as well. What happens is that at some point, drugs
change the way the abuser's brain is functioning. When
that point is reached, it's as if a switch is thrown in the
brain, thereby resulting in addiction. This modified brain
may help explain why many addicts say they are unable to
control their desire or cravings for drugs.
One might ask where voluntary drug-taking behavior ends
and the compulsive disease of addiction begins.
32 6
Some experts believe that choice remains an important factor in al-
cohol consumption and drug-taking, however. One authority, for ex-
ample, writes:
The research showing that addictive behaviors are not dis-
eases is over two decades old .... Addictive behavior, like
all voluntary behavior, responds to rewards and punish-
ment, and is not governed by some internal and unalterable
disease process. Although biological factors are certainly
present, these factors influence choices but do not dictate
ner states that the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, the
American Psychiatric Association, and the American Medical Association all
define drug addiction as uncontrollable, compulsive drug seeking and use. See
id.
326. Id. at 16. (quoting Dr. Leshner). Dr. Leshner also states:
Although the onset of addiction begins with the voluntary act of taking
drugs, the continued repetition of voluntary drug taking begins to
change into involuntary drug taking, ultimately to the point that the
behavior is driven by a compulsive craving for the drug. This com-
pulsion results from a combination of factors, including in large part
the dramatic changes in brain function produced by prolonged drug
use. This is why addiction is considered a brain disease-one with
embedded behavioral and social aspects. Once addicted, it is almost
impossible for most people to stop the spiraling cycle of addiction on
their own without treatment
Alan I. Leshner, Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment,
282 JAMA 1314, 1314-15 (1999).
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them.
327
Clearly, much research still needs to be done. As one expert writes,
"At a time when American science moves a robot on Mars, it is in-
cumbent upon each of us to push for research to unveil the mystery
of addiction. 328 In particular, as Dr. Leshner's statement indicates,
work still needs to be done to identify when drug-taking ceases to be
a matter of choice and becomes an addiction. Even so, most experts
appear to accept the view that excessive consumption of alcohol and
certain drugs leads to biochemical changes in the brain that limit the
element of choice in the behavior.
If there is consensus in the relevant scientific community that
drug addiction can be explained at least in significant part as a brain
disorder, it is arguably not appropriate for courts to treat evidence of
drug addiction as character evidence. Seen that way, evidence of
Cunningham's Demerol addiction would not violate the ban on char-
acter evidence, and was potentially admissible under the "other
crimes, wrongs, or acts" rule as evidence of motive.
Having reached that conclusion, the court's obligation was to
weigh the probative value of the evidence for its legitimate purpose
of showing a motive against the danger that the jury will misuse the
evidence. If the research is correct, the evidence appears to possess
fairly high probative value.329 That is, if drug addiction is truly a
disease characterized by uncontrolled, compulsive behavior aimed at
obtaining drugs, it sets up a powerful motive inference. At the same
time, the court must consider the danger of unfair prejudice. Roger
Park has identified two basic types of unfair prejudice: inferential
error prejudice and nullification prejudice.330 Inferential error preju-
dice occurs "if the trier overvalues the evidence in determining
whether the defendant committed the crime charged. Nullification
327. A. Thomas Horvath, Alcoholism: 12-Step Isn't For Everyone, NAT'L
PSYCHOLOGIST, July-Aug. 2000, at lB.
328. Id. (statement by Dr. Zakharia).
329. Enhancing the probative value of the past addiction evidence in Cm-
ningham is the finding that "for many people, addiction becomes a chronic re-
curring disorder." Leshner, supra note 326, at 1314.
330. See Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717,
720 (1998).
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prejudice occurs if the trier decides to punish the defendant for acts
other than those charged. ' 33'
In Cunningham, the primary risk seems to be from inferential er-
ror prejudice. This might occur in at least two ways. First, jurors
might assign too much value to the evidence as proof of the first in-
ference: that Cunningham was addicted to Demerol at the time of
the charged theft. If the prosecution offered little other evidence that
Cunningham was addicted to Demerol at the time of the charged
theft, and jurors had no other basis from which to judge the likeli-
hood of continued addiction or relapse, they might accord too much
weight to the evidence of a four-year-old addiction. The fact that
Cunningham's urine tested positive for the presence of Demerol in
her system might have reduced the potential prejudicial impact of the
questioned evidence, however. Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, jurors might overvalue the evidence as proof of the second in-
ferential step: that as a person addicted to Demerol, Cunningham is
more likely to have stolen the drug from the medicine cabinet than
the other nurses who had access. Even following a judge's caution-
ary instruction not to use the evidence to infer bad character, jurors
might overstate the likelihood that a person in Cunningham's posi-
tion would steal to feed her habit. Though it is difficult to evaluate
the reactions of lay jurors to evidence of prior addiction in a case
such as this, it does seem reasonable to fear that jurors will too read-
ily assume that an addict-even a professional nurse-will steal.
332
The balance of probative value and prejudice is highly context-
dependent; neither probative value nor prejudice exist in a vac-
uum.333  There is empirical evidence suggesting that judges have
331. Id.
332. Nullification prejudice is also possible in Cunningham. Societal atti-
tudes toward illicit drug use and drug addiction have become increasingly hos-
tile. Though Cunningham was neither charged with selling drugs nor sold
them in the past, it is possible that jurors will choose to punish her for her past
addiction rather than for the theft with which she is currently charged.
333. For an analysis of the probative value-prejudicial impact balancing test,
see Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature
of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497 (1983); Victor J.
Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 59 (1984); Edward J. Imwinkehied, The Meaning of Probative
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widely different views on what constitutes prejudicial evidence.334
Nevertheless, trial courts must take their responsibilities seriously,
and should place on the record the reasons for their evidentiary rul-
ings. Whether in Cunningham the court struck the appropriate bal-
ance is a close question. Had I been the judge, I might have erred on
the side of exclusion on the basis that there was other evidence that
Cunningham might have a current Demerol addiction (the positive
result of her urine test), making it less necessary to inform the jury of
a four-year-old addiction. Regardless of the proper outcome, the
analytical path through Rules 404(b) and 403 is set, and appellate
oversight is both possible and crucial.
335
VI. CONCLUSION
The motive-to-identity theory in Cunningham illustrates the im-
precision of our definition of character and the need to go behind the
labels to examine the underlying purposes of the character rule. Our
society long ago deemed trial by character impermissible, and we
must guard that principle with a system of evidence law that not only
purports to exclude character evidence to prove conduct, but seeks to
minimize the danger that the jury will misunderstand its instructions
and circumvent the rules. When the thin line betveen character and
motive is approached, the court must consider not only the validity of
the abstract theory asserted by the proponent of the evidence, but the
likelihood that the overriding goals of the trial will be served by ad-
mission or exclusion.
The problem raised by motive in Cunningham has a counterpart
in sexual assault and child molestation cases, where many courts
have permitted introduction of past similar misconduct with the same
victi, 336 Even as a matter of abstract theory, these cases come
Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 be Used
to Resurrect the Common Lav ofEvidence?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 879 (1988).
334. See, e.g., Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of
Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?,
1983 Wis. L. REv. 1147.
335. See David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70
N.C. L. REv. 1155, 1155 (1992) (arguing for more appellate oversight of trial
court evidentiary rulings).
336. See United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1996);
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dangerously close to crossing the character line; in practice, there is
little doubt that the effect of admitting the evidence is to condone
trial by character. Though recent federal evidence reform has largely
mooted this concern for sexual assault and child molestation cases,
337
that reform has been the subject of intense criticism, 338 and the issue
is still up for grabs in most states.
Rule 404(b), so brief and straightforward in language, raises a
mass of complex analytical questions. The Rule and its common-law
counterpart have never been understood well or applied consistently.
The goal of this Article has been to examine the "motive" theory for
admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence, with an eye toward
eventual reconciliation of the rule with the prohibition of character
evidence. It is a small step on a long road.
see also supra text accompanying notes 310-14.
337. See FED. R. EVID. 413 (admitting evidence of similar crimes "for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant" in prosecution for sexual as-
sault); FED. R. EvID. 414 (admitting evidence of similar crimes in prosecutions
for child molestation); FED. R. EVID. 415 (admitting evidence of similar acts in
civil actions involving sexual assault or child molestation). All three rules
were passed as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16, 18, 21,
28 (1994)).
338. The literature on these rules is extensive and growing. For a list of
some commentaries, both favorable and unfavorable, see Leonard, In Defense,
supra note 35, at 1162-63 & nn.7-8.
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